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Humor can be dissected as a frog can, but the thing dies in the process
and the innards are discouraging to any but the pure scientific mind.
—E. B. White, author of Charlotte’s Web
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PREFACE
During the final season of the TV series Seinfeld, Elaine dramatically stormed
down to The New Yorker editor’s office to demand an explanation for an ambiguous
cartoon, only to find there wasn’t one: the editor admitted he merely “liked the kitty.”
The episode, entitled “The Cartoon” and written by real-life New Yorker cartoonist Bruce
Eric Kaplan, is undoubtedly a humorous illustration of art imitating life.
In an example of life imitating art, current cartoon editor Robert Mankoff was
also recently asked to explain a cartoon that appeared in The New Yorker (Mankoff,
2012). He cites E. B. White’s famous quote as a disclaimer before attempting to quantify
the otherwise unquantifiable experience of comedy, warning readers that dissecting the
cartoon would likely spoil its joke—and perhaps even all humor in general. Reluctantly,
Mankoff ranks ambiguity and incongruity high among humor’s essential ingredients.
This year, University of California San Diego psychologists joined forces with
Mankoff to more scientifically examine comedy in a study of gender differences,
revealing what some may argue is another key feature of humor. Pitting women’s
abilities against men’s in the creation of humorous captions for a selection of New Yorker
cartoons, men very slightly but significantly outperformed women in the comedy
department, thereby providing a kernel of truth to the stereotype that men are funnier than
women. And in a second study, which perhaps serves to perpetuate or even explain this
stereotype, both men and women misremembered the more humorous captions as having
been written by men (Mickes, Walker, Parris, Mankoff, & Christenfeld, 2012).
vi
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Previous psychologists who were also interested in examining what makes
cartoons funny employed a novel and implicit manipulation of the “facial feedback
hypothesis.” According to the hypothesis, emotions can begin on the outside and affect
how we feel inside (Buck, 1980). In an effort to simulate emotions as outside-in, Strack,
Martin, and Stepper (1988) contracted either participants’ “smiling muscles” or their
“frowning muscles” to see if these artificially-originated facial expressions would
influence participants’ experience of humor when assigning ratings to cartoons.
To achieve this, the researchers had participants grasp a pen between their teeth
(producing a smile) or between their lips—creating a frown. Unlike previous scientists’
recreations of emotions through muscle and electrode stimulation, Strack et al.’s (1988)
participants performed the cartoon rating exercise under the guise of a pilot study on
coordination to help gain insight into workarounds for people with physical impairments.
This cover story ensured that participants would be unaware that their smiling and
frowning muscles had been implicitly activated and prevented participants’ realization
that these activations might impact their humor ratings of cartoons.
It should not be surprising that Strack et al. (1988) found that participants rated
cartoons as funnier when holding a pen between their teeth than those who held a pen
between their lips. Moreover, the authors demonstrated that this effect occurred in the
absence of participants’ awareness that these facial expressions had even been activated.
In other words, judgments of humor were implicitly increased under the “facilitating
condition” of a smile and implicitly decreased under the “inhibiting condition” of a
frown. These results were replicated in a second study and, importantly, were limited to
ratings made by participants who were instructed to rely on their affective and subjective
vii
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reactions to the cartoons vs. those who were asked to arrive at objective, cognitive-based
humor ratings.
Around the same time, a Belgian researcher observed that attractiveness ratings
for letters of the alphabet were also influenced by an implicit process that operated
outside of participants’ awareness: their positive self-associations for name letters
(Nuttin, 1985; 1987). In other words, judgments of letter attractiveness were implicitly
increased under the facilitating condition of shared letter similarity. In the years that
followed, this “name letter effect” was found to extend to both mundane and important
decision-making, while moderators that served to bolster or attenuate the effect were also
discovered and still continue to be identified.
Drawing inspiration from the findings of Strack et al.’s (1988) humor judgments
experiment and research on the name letter effect, the author of the present study
wondered whether the “facilitating condition” of shared first name initials with cartoon
caption writers would implicitly increase participant judges’ humor ratings for these
writers’ captions in a “mock” New Yorker cartoon caption contest. Would participants’
positive self-associations for their own name letters unwittingly influence their
evaluations of cartoon captions written by writers who shared their initial letter, relative
to captions written by writers with dissimilar initial letters and as compared to
evaluations made by non-initial matching participants? If found, would this effect be
influenced by both old and new moderating variables? The present study sought to
answer these and other questions about the name letter effect in judgments of humor. To
this pure scientific mind, dissecting the experience of humor in search of its implicit
egotism innards would prove quite interesting indeed.
viii
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ABSTRACT
The present study demonstrates that implicit egotism is relevant to not only letter
attractiveness ratings on the Name Letter Test (NLT), but also to judgments of humor—
albeit to a lesser degree. Respondents participated as “mock” judges in a simulated
cartoon caption contest and evaluated writers’ caption submissions for two cartoons. It
was hypothesized that participants would exhibit biases toward captions submitted by
writers with whom they shared a first initial letter, and additionally, their gender. A name
letter effect was found in participants’ judgments of humor and on the NLT. Shared
gender with a caption writer—when coupled with a shared initial—increased biases
toward these writers’ captions, but not significantly so. The impact of implicit self-esteem
on initial-letter biases was examined, with level of implicit self-esteem weakly predicting
NLT biases, but not biases demonstrated toward captions submitted by same-initial
writers. While name-letter preferences are believed to tap implicit self-esteem, less than
one-third of participants demonstrated high implicit self-esteem, despite the very large
name letter effect observed on the NLT. This challenges the notion that people
overwhelmingly possess the positive self-attitudes thought to ignite implicit egotism.
Recent researchers have suggested that the NLT is best understood as a measure for
which it was first designed—implicit egotism, the tendency to display automatic selfpositivity biases toward targets that share our self-attributes—instead of a measure of
implicit self-esteem. This possibility is discussed and explored with analyses of the
relationships between the NLT, explicit self-esteem, and implicit self-esteem.
xii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
By most standards, psychologists have only somewhat recently begun to examine
people’s profound affection for the attribute that is most closely related to the self, i.e.,
one’s own name—a principle that human relations guru Dale Carnegie taught his students
more than three quarters of a century ago. Carnegie (1936) asserted that “there is no
sweeter sound than one’s own name” almost 50 years before Nuttin (1985, 1987) would
experimentally demonstrate people’s preferences for their name letters over non-name
letters in the social psychological phenomenon known as “the name letter effect.”
Researchers have since found name-letter preferences to extend beyond just
mundane decision-making. This automatic and unconscious bias appears to manifest
itself in not only everyday decisions, but important ones as well such as people’s
preferences for places of residence, careers, and even mates. Because choosing a place to
live, career, or life partner because of shared name letters is unlikely to reflect a
conscious decision, researchers have labeled this phenomenon “implicit egotism”
(Pelham, Mirenberg, & Jones, 2002). The study of implicit egotism has predominantly
focused on people’s profound affection for their own name letters. However, some
researchers argue that virtually any self-attribute, including something as trivial as shared
birthdates or birthday numbers (Kityama & Karasawa, 1997; Pelham et al., 2002; see also
Finch & Cialdini, 1989), can foster implicit egotism.

"!
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Interesting paradigms have been used to study the seemingly illogical yet
predictable decisions we make as a result of our implicit positive biases we have toward
our name letters and other self-attributes. In a series of ten different studies, Pelham et al.
(2002) demonstrated that important life decisions can fall prey to implicit egotism. First,
they discovered that people are disproportionately more likely to live in cities and states
that resemble their names. Specifically, U.S. citizens were more likely to move to or
reside in places that shared several letters of their first or last name (Louis’s
disproportionately populate St. Louis and Louisiana) or places that resembled their
birthday numbers (a disproportionate number of people born on May 5th live in Five
Points, Alabama). Follow-up studies have found similar effects where individuals’
surnames match the street on which they choose to live (Pelham, Carvallo, DeHart, &
Jones, 2003).
Another major life decision influenced by implicit egotism is that of career
choice. Pelham et al. (2002) found that a disproportionate number of people whose names
begin with “Den” (e.g., Denis and Denise) make their livelihoods as dentists, while
names beginning with “La” (e.g., Larry and Laura) are overrepresented within the law
profession. Similarly, authors of scholarly articles in the geosciences are more likely than
chance to be named George and Geoffrey.
But perhaps the most significant life decision studied by implicit egotism
researchers to date is that of mate selection. Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, and Mirenberg
(2004) found evidence that brides and grooms gravitate toward spouses whose first
names share letters with their own. These authors also observed surname-matching
effects for married couples, despite our culture’s strong taboos against incest.

3
In sum, implicit egotism researchers have found the name letter effect to be quite
robust, extending to both everyday and important decisions. Moreover, name-letter
preferences are not merely an American phenomenon, but rather, have been demonstrated
in other countries and cultures as well (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Kityama & Karasawa, 1997,
Hoorens & Todorova, 1988; Nuttin, 1987). Researchers have examined several different
possible mediating mechanisms underlying the name letter effect, each of which will be
described below.
What Mediates the Name Letter Effect?
The Primacy Effect
One explanation for name-letter preferences that has since been discounted is “the
primacy effect.” Researchers Hoorens and Todorova (1988) compared Bulgarian
students’ preferences for their name letters in their native and second languages. They
hypothesized that if the name letter effect is simply due to a primacy effect of the name
letters these students learned first in their native language, then they should not prefer
their name letters over non-name letters in a later-learned second language. Preferences
for name letters, however, were found for both the Bulgarians’ native Cyrillic alphabet
and within the Roman alphabet they learned in a second, more recently acquired language
(Hoorens & Todorova, 1988).
The Mere Exposure Effect
The “mere exposure effect” suggests that we prefer things with which we are
familiar, therefore repeated exposure to them can increase both familiarity and ultimately
liking (Zajonc, 1968). Moreover, instead of being a cognitive or post-cognitive
phenomenon, this effect appears to be a purely affective experience, occurring
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independently of any intervening cognitive processes (Zajonc, 1980). If we encounter our
name letters more frequently than the other letters of the alphabet, then according to the
mere exposure effect, perhaps this is why we prefer them.
Kitayama and Karasawa (1997), however, ruled out the mere exposure effect as a
possible mediator of preferences for numbers that make up one’s birthday, a form of
implicit egotism similar to name-letter preferences. Participants in their study exhibited
stronger preferences for birth date numbers 13-31 than the numbers 1-12, despite
encountering the numbers 1-12 more frequently in everyday life (Kitayama & Karasawa,
1997). These findings demonstrate the link between number preferences and our positive
bias toward objects related to the self, while simultaneously ruling out mere exposure as a
mediating variable.
In another study, researchers Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, and Hetts (2002) found
that people prefer six of the most frequently used letters of the alphabet (A, E, I, N, S,
and T) to the six least often used letters (J, K, Q, W, X, and Z). These preferences,
however, were overshadowed by biases toward name letters, suggesting again that the
name letter effect is a product of something much more than mere exposure. In fact,
people with rare initials preferred their initial letters more than two of the most frequently
occurring letters, E and S (Jones et al., 2002). These findings staunchly challenge mere
exposure as a mediator of name-letter biases. If name-letter preferences were in fact due
to the mere exposure effect, these preferences should be much less pronounced for people
with uncommon initials since they are not exposed to these letters very frequently.
Finally, two other studies in which ownership of name-related and non-namerelated “symbols” were induced provide additional evidence against mere exposure’s role
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in self-related preferences (Feys, 1991). In these experiments, participants were equally
exposed to novel symbols that they were led to believe either belonged to their own or
someone else’s name. Name-related biases still occurred, i.e., participants preferred
symbols associated with their own name more than those associated with another
person’s name without having been exposed to their name-related symbols more
frequently (Feys, 1991).
Evaluative Conditioning
Having failed to find support for mere exposure as a determinant of name-related
preferences, Feys (1995) set out to test another hypothesis that might explain the name
letter effect. The author was intrigued by the evidence he found that mere ownership can
be temporarily induced in a laboratory setting and also that this newly-found ownership
was strong enough to create preferences for symbols associated with the self. Moreover,
this effect did not appear to be a function of classical conditioning since the author
controlled for the duration of symbol induction (the number of trials it took participants
to learn self- vs. other-related symbols) or mere exposure since participants were exposed
equally to self- vs. other-related symbols. Feys (1995) next decided to examine the role
“evaluative conditioning” might play in self-related preferences in a follow-up study.
Since implicit egotism embodies the positive biases we have toward objects
related to the self, it implies a mediating relationship between exposure to these objects
and our preferences for them. As such, it is believed to elicit an affective—albeit
implicit—response to these attributes or objects en route. “Evaluative conditioning,” on
the other hand, is not considered a “true” mediator since it occurs automatically without
any affective or cognitive processing. For example, very early research by Syz (1926)
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demonstrated that of fifty different stimuli presented, the one that achieved the most
frequent (84% of the time) automatic galvanic skin responses for participants was his or
her own name. For these reasons argues Fey (1995), evaluative conditioning—if
supported—would be a much more “parsimonious” explanation than the mere ownership
hypothesis because it is purely automatic and occurs without any intervening processes.
To examine evaluative conditioning as a potential mediator of name-related
preferences, Feys (1995) visually paired Japanese Kanji symbols with participants’ name
letters and non-name letters. In a control condition, participants were instructed to simply
remember which symbols corresponded to their own versus another’s name without the
aid of “visual pairing” (seeing the Kanji symbol alongside Roman alphabet letters). In
both conditions, participants preferred the symbols associated with his or her own name
more strongly than symbols associated with another person’s name. However, this effect
was even stronger in the non-evaluative conditioning (no visual pairing) control condition
where participants simply remembered that the symbols were name-related. These results
led Feys (1995) to conclude that evaluative conditioning is not necessary to elicit namerelated preferences (in his experiment, simply knowing the symbols were name-relevant
was sufficient) and that “mere ownership” is a more likely determinant. Mere ownership,
while similar to implicit egotism, differs in that it often embodies an explicit awareness
that a stimulus object is “mine.” Implicit egotism, on the other hand, occurs outside of
our conscious awareness, i.e., is driven by an implicit process or unconscious mechanism.
Subjective Frequency
Researchers Hoorens and Nuttin (1993) tested the hypothesis that the name letter
effect might be attributable to an exaggerated subjective frequency of exposure to one’s
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name letters. As Nuttin (1985; 1987) was the first researcher to identify the name letter
effect, the purpose of his and Hoorens’s 1993 study was to test an alternative hypothesis
that might explain this phenomenon. Previous researchers had already demonstrated that
people’s affective reactions to objects might be driven by their perceived (vs. their actual)
familiarity with them (Matlin, 1971; Moreland & Zajonc, 1977, 1979). Based on this
principle, Hoorens and Nuttin (1993) considered that name letters might be preferred
simply because people overestimate their exposure to them and thus their familiarity with
them.
While subjective frequency for name letters was somewhat exaggerated, the
authors found no relationship between name-letter preferences and participants’ reports
of their subjective frequency of exposure to these letters (Hoorens & Nuttin, 1993). The
authors did, however, find evidence of a name letter effect, which was strengthened when
participants believed that their name a) would suit someone they admired from the same
gender, b) would suit a member of a professional group to which they would like to
belong, and c) carried a strong likelihood of being chosen as a name for themselves if
they had had the opportunity to so choose.
Implicit Self-Esteem
Intrigued by their discovery that numerous Dutch nationals still kept their
ancestors’ surnames that were chosen out of rebellion and carried unfavorable
translations, Koole and Pelham (2003) also decided to investigate the underpinnings of
the name letter effect. The authors believed that the Dutch’s commitment to these madeup names suggested an underlying implicit favorable self-attitude that spilled over into a
fondness for their surname self-attribute. After performing a comprehensive review of

8
studies on the name letter effect, they argue that name-letter preferences are most likely
driven by one’s implicit self-esteem for the following reasons. First, name letters
represent a self-attribute. Secondly, letter preferences largely reflect a positive bias
toward own-name letters. Thirdly, these preferences operate outside of one’s awareness
(“implicitly”), and lastly, no other factors can account for the numerous studies which
have consistently found biases toward name letters (Koole & Pelham, 2003).
Since then, researchers have begun to explore the relationship between selfesteem and name-letter preferences. After subjecting participants to self-esteemenhancing conditioning, Dijksterhuis (2004) found stronger name letter effects for these
participants compared to controls. By subliminally pairing the word “I” with positive trait
terms, the author was able to temporarily increase both implicit self-esteem and nameletter preferences (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Baccus, Baldwin, and Packer (2004) found a
similar increase in implicit self-esteem and name-letter preferences in an experiment that
paired self-relevant information with “socially-approving” happy faces. Finally, Jones et
al. (2004) demonstrated that temporary threats to the self-concept increased attraction to a
potential dating partner whose screen name shared letters of participants’ names. Taken
together, these studies appear to suggest at least some underlying component of selfesteem in name-letter biases.
Implicit Egotism
While often used interchangeably with “implicit self-esteem,” implicit egotism
refers uniquely to our preferences for self-related objects, which are driven by our
unconscious positive self-biases (Pelham et al., 2005). Whether these automatic positivity
biases that are overwhelmingly displayed in peoples’ preferences for self-related objects
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suggest an equally overwhelming and underlying incidence of favorable implicit selfesteem is debatable. Recent researchers Buhrmester, Blanton, and Swann, (2011) argue
that two widely used measures of implicit self-esteem, the Implicit Association Test
(IAT; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) and the Name Letter Test (NLT; Nuttin, 1985;
1987), do not measure participants’ implicit global evaluations of the self. Rather, these
authors believe that the IAT is a more appropriate measure of implicit affect and the NLT
is best understood as a measure of the tendency to display automatic self-positivity
biases, i.e., “implicit egotism”—instead of a tool to measure implicit self-esteem
(Buhrmester et al., 2011).
At first, some researchers questioned the “implicitness” of their own findings after
discovering the strongest effects occurred when entire names matched a target (e.g., a
state where one chooses to live), however, their follow-up study provided irrefutable
evidence that implicit egotism is indeed implicit. In their self-described “strictest test of
implicit egotism” to date, these authors found men participants demonstrated increased
attraction to a photograph of a woman after subliminally pairing her football jersey
number with these participants’ names (Jones et al., 2004).
Even outside of the psychology laboratory, consciously choosing a career,
residence, or mate because of shared name letters is ultimately not only foolhardy, but
improbable. Regardless of the mechanism underlying name-letter preferences, it seems as
though most researchers agree that it is implicit. Pelham et al. (2005) point out that
significant life decisions regarding careers, places of residence, and mate selection are
highly unlikely to be a product of “explicit egotism” when these choices share letters with
one’s own name. And finally, in all of the above experiments studying name-letter
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preferences, researchers very seldom ever reported that participants were able to guess
the hypotheses of their studies. This further supports the notion that our bias toward our
name letters operates outside of our awareness.
Moderators of the Name Letter Effect
The identification of moderators of the name letter effect has further strengthened
the evidence that our positive (in valence, but not necessarily in content) self-biases are
indeed responsible for name-letter preferences. In addition to previous researchers’
findings that unique name letters (Jones et al., 2002; Pelham et al., 2002) and self-esteem
enhancement (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Baccus et al., 2004) can intensify the name letter
effect, other variables such as gender (Pelham et al., 2002; Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997)
and self-concept threats (Brendl, Chattopadhyay, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2005; Jones et al.,
2004, 2002) have also been found to differentially influence preferences for name letters.
Uniqueness of Name
Having an uncommon name serves to strengthen the name letter effect and—as
mentioned previously with respect to rare initials—simultaneously discounts mere
exposure as a determinant of name-letter preferences (Jones et al., 2002; Pelham et al.,
2002). For example, one study found that people with unique names exhibited stronger
biases than people with more common names as evidenced by the disproportionate
number of people residing in states that resembled their own (uncommon) name (Pelham
et al., 2002). This finding again challenges mere exposure as an explanation for the effect
because the mere exposure hypothesis argues that people develop preferences after
repeated exposure to the object or stimulus. However, people with unique names do not
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encounter their names with the same frequency as do those with more common names,
therefore biases toward name-letter cannot be explained by mere exposure.
Gender Differences
In addition to finding “letter position” effects, i.e., participants preferred the first
letter of their names (initial) more strongly than other letters in their names, Kitayama
and Karasawa (1997) found significant gender differences among name-letter
preferences. Specifically, initial-letter preferences were stronger for men’s surname
initial than for their first name initial, while females demonstrated stronger biases toward
their first initial than their surname initial. The authors explain this gender difference as
owing to men’s and women’s differential association between the self and their first vs.
last names. Whereas Japanese men are expected to carry on their family names when
married, women are expected to change their last name to that of their husband’s upon
marriage. Therefore, a stronger sense of self is derived by men from their last names,
while women derive their sense of self more from their first names as this is the name
that will remain with them throughout their lifetime (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997).
Gender differences were also found in Pelham et al.’s (2002) study which
examined the likelihood of living in a state as a function of one’s first name. Males were
26% more likely than chance to reside in states that resembled their first name (i.e.,
Kenneths disproportionately populated the state of Kentucky), while females were 44%
more likely than chance to live in first-name matching states. Additional analyses that
focused on state immigration data and the populations of “Saint” cities also revealed
stronger evidence of implicit egotism among females when these states and cities
resembled their first name (Pelham et al., 2002). Because the tradition of women taking
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their husbands’ last names upon marriage is customary in the U.S. as well, it stands to
reason that American females would also derive a stronger sense of self from their first
names and exhibit—on an unconscious level—a greater attraction to and preference for
places of residence which contain their first name letters.
Explicit Self-Esteem and Self-Concept Threats
As previously discussed, name-letter preferences have been found to increase
after self-esteem enhancement. Likewise, a “threat” to the self-concept can also bolster
the name letter effect. Ostensibly, one way people protect their sense of self-worth in the
face of self-concept threats is by automatically enhancing the value of self-associated
symbols, including exhibiting preferences for name letters. For example, Jones et al.
(2002) found differential name-letter and birthday-number preferences among
participants with low and high explicit self-esteem after they experienced a self-concept
threat. Specifically, evaluations of name letters and birthday numbers were strengthened
after high explicit self-esteem participants were asked to write about a personal flaw.
Born from a well-practiced need to self-enhance, preferring our name letters when
confronted with them can help restore homeostasis to our temporarily injured selfesteem—much like a defense mechanism. This perspective views name-letter preferences
as an unconscious form of self-regulation, with this type of self-serving bias particularly
pronounced for those with high explicit self-esteem.
Brendl et al. (2005) also found differential effects for name-letter preferences
after participants either wrote about something they wished to change about themselves
vs. something positive about themselves. Namely, those who experienced a self-concept
threat (wrote about a personal flaw) showed stronger biases toward a fictitious brand of
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Japanese cracker that contained their name letters, while those in the self-affirmation
condition preferred the name-letter and non-name letter brand equally (Brendl et al.,
2005). Experiencing a threat to the self-concept in and of itself was a motive for
participants to self-enhance when given the opportunity to evaluate a brand that shared
their name letters.
Self-Attitude Accessibility
Bosson, Swann, and Pennebaker (2000) found that explicit measures of selfesteem given prior to implicit measures—including an initial-preferences task—served to
increase the correlation between the two types of self-esteem. In Krizan and Suls’ (2008)
meta-analysis of 10 different studies administering the NLT, the authors found a small
but significant correlation between the NLT and explicit self-esteem measures. These
authors also found the following order effects for the two types of measures: explicit
measures of self-esteem administered prior to the NLT strengthened the correlation,
while the correlation decreased but was still significant when the NLT was given first.
This moderating effect of instrument order is explained as participants’ self-attitudes
becoming more accessible after the administration of explicit self-esteem measures and
essentially priming one’s own attitudes about oneself (Krizan & Suls, 2008).
Establishing Mediation and Moderation in
Future Research on the Name Letter Effect
In sum, when the study of name-letter preferences was still in its infancy,
researchers endeavored to identify the type of mechanism underlying the name letter
effect. Beginning with Hoorens and Todorova (1988), these authors failed to find support
for mediation via the primacy effect when name-letter preferences were found in both the
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participants’ native Cyrillic alphabet and their later-learned Roman alphabet. Next, Feys
(1991) discounted “the mere exposure effect” as a mediator of name-letter biases when
he induced ownership of name-related and non-name related novel symbols among
participants by holding the number of learning trials constant for both types of symbols,
and in the end, still found strong biases toward name-related symbols. Kitayama and
Karasawa (1997) also failed to find support for “the mere exposure effect” as
instrumental in producing self-related preferences (birth date numbers) since participants
still demonstrated biases toward the numbers 13-31, even though we are exposed to the
numbers 1-12 with greater frequency. Jones et al.’s (2002) finding that people preferred
their initial-letters more than other letters of the alphabet—even when their initials were
rare—further discounts “the mere exposure effect” as a determinant of name-letter
preferences. What this group of experiments tells us about the biases we exhibit toward
our name letters is that these biases are not due to having been exposed to our name
letters first in life, nor are they a product of more frequent exposure to our name letters.
Hoorens and Nuttin (1993) examined “subjective frequency” as a possible
mediator of the name letter effect, testing the hypothesis that people prefer their name
letters because of the false perception that they encounter them more frequently than they
really do. While participants did somewhat exaggerate the frequency with which they
encountered their name letters relative to non-name letters, the authors found no
relationship between the name-letter preferences they observed and participants’
subjective reports of their frequency of exposure to these letters. “Evaluative
conditioning,” while at first promising to be a more parsimonious explanation for nameletter preferences because it was devoid of both affective and cognitive processing, also
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failed to be a substantiated mediator since subjects still preferred symbols associated with
their own-name letters with or without their name letter serving as a visual cue (Feys,
1995). These researchers consistently found that participants preferred their name letters
simply because they were just that, “theirs,” and thus “mere ownership” as a mediator of
the name letter effect paved the way for a closely related determinant and what
contemporary researchers now refer to as “implicit egotism.”
Implicit egotism is the underlying process responsible for the name letter effect
whereby participants’ self-biases spill over into their evaluations of self-related stimuli,
such as objects that share their name letters. Unlike “mere ownership,” however, implicit
egotism operates outside of our awareness, whereas the mere ownership effect involves
an awareness that an object is “mine” and consequently its value is overestimated (see
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990 for one famous empirical example of “the
endowment effect”).
Early researchers’ painstaking efforts to uncover the mediating mechanism
responsible for the name letter effect all point to an implicit bias toward our own selfattributes. Pioneering researchers of the name letter effect now believe that one of our
many self-serving biases is at work and attempts to prove that other motivational and
cognitive processes are at work would be unfruitful, if not impossible (Hoorens & Nuttin,
1993). Empirically establishing the mediating mechanism underlying self-related
preferences is extraordinarily difficult due to the automatic and unconscious nature of
people’s self-associations and/or self-positivity biases. Moreover, attempting to measure
these self-associations and biases are liable to change name-letter preferences. Thus,
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current implicit egotism scholars overwhelmingly focus their research instead on
studying new moderating variables over mediators.
Is the NLT Simply a Measure of Implicit Self-Esteem?
According to Pelham et al. (2002), implicit egotism reflects “an unconscious
process grounded in people’s favorable self-associations” and is “an implicit judgmental
consequence of people’s positive associations” (p. 106). The key assumption underlying
name-letter preferences is that “people’s positive associations about themselves spill over
into their evaluations of objects associated with the self” (Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, &
Hetts, 2002, p. 170). Whether the self-associations thought to drive implicit egotism and
the name letter effect are positive (i.e., “favorable”) in content or are merely positively
valenced has recently been debated. Implicit egotism and implicit self-esteem are often
used interchangeably, thus measures of name-letter preferences are often used as indexes
of people’s unconscious global self-attitudes, i.e., “implicit self-esteem.” Even though
implicit egotism and implicit self-esteem are similar constructs, there remains some
disagreement as to whether they are distinct, synonymous, or merely related.
Researchers such as Greenwald and Banaji (1995) argue that name-letter
preferences are driven by individuals’ high self-esteem, with these preferences offering a
glimpse into people’s global evaluations of themselves (Koole & Pelham, 2003). While
these and other researchers have suggested that implicit egotism is driven by an
underlying sense of high self-worth, more recent researchers, however, argue that
measures like the Name Letter Test tap implicit egotism, but not necessarily implicit selfesteem (Buhrmester, Blanton, & Swann, 2011).
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Buhrmester et al. (2011) are skeptical of the NLT’s psychometric properties as a
measure of implicit self-esteem because of its poor construct validity, low predictability
of general well-being/depression, and low correlations with explicit measures of selfesteem, among other issues. The fact that name-letter preferences are overwhelmingly
exhibited on the NLT—enough to compel researchers to administer it as a tool to
measure self-esteem—suggests that respondents are likely relying on automatic, universal
self-positivity biases instead of providing a window into their global self-worth. If nameletter preference tasks like the NLT did measure implicit self-esteem, one would expect
significantly more variability in name-letter biases commensurate with the variability that
surely exists in the population’s implicit self-esteem. Surely the overwhelming majority
of people are not fortunate enough to possess high implicit self-esteem. Or are they?
The jury is still out with respect to whether the NLT is a valid measure of implicit
self-esteem, or whether it simply taps implicit egotism, the simple tendency to
unconsciously gravitate toward objects which share our name letters—as it was
“originally conceptualized” to do (Buhrmester et al., 2001). Examining the conditions
under which name-letter preferences are bolstered, reduced, or even reversed is therefore
of great theoretical interest and is important for future research on implicit egotism.
Pelham et al. (2005) have hailed the role of implicit self-esteem in name-letter
preferences as one of the next frontiers of implicit egotism, suggesting that biases might
be reduced or even reversed for those who truly possess negative self-attitudes. If,
however, Buhrmester et al. (2011) are correct in arguing that implicit egotism instead
taps a tendency to display automatic self-positivity biases—regardless of one’s level of
implicit self-esteem—then implicit self-esteem should not impact name-letter
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preferences. Thus, examining the role of implicit self-esteem in initial-letter biases was
one of the aims of the present research, which are discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 2
AIMS OF THE CURRENT STUDY
One of the aims of the current study was to offer a unique paradigm in which the
name letter effect could be examined in everyday decision-making. Specifically, the
researcher sought to investigate whether the otherwise subjective experience of humor
would be influenced by an objective and predictable implicit process, our bias toward our
name letters. A second aim was to examine two new variables that may influence the
name letter effect: gender-matching and implicit self-esteem. To this end, and as
described in the previous chapter, authors such as Pelham, Carvallo, and Jones (2005)
have raised the question of whether implicit egotism researchers’ observed name letter
effects might be due to the majority of participants’ good fortune of having unconscious
favorable self-attitudes, and further underscore the possibility that their typical implicit
egotism findings “would be reversed among people who possess truly negative selfassociations, i.e., for those with low levels of implicit self-esteem” (Pelham et al., 2005,
p. 109). Thus, research which seeks to pursue this possibility that typical implicit egotism
findings could be reversed among individuals with unfavorable implicit self-esteem is
extremely theoretically worthwhile and will make important contributions to social
psychology and research on the name letter effect. However, measuring an implicit
construct such as self-esteem is often tenuous and requires indirect assessment.
Fortunately, a valid and efficient measure has recently been developed to measure
implicit self-attitudes.
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Authors Gebauer, Riketta, Broemer and Maio (2008) examined participants’
liking for their entire names instead of individual name letters to devise a single-item
measure of implicit self-esteem. For this measure, participants are simply asked to
indicate how much they like their full name using a scale with endpoints of “not at all” to
“very much.” Comparisons with two widely used measures of implicit self-biases, the
Self-Esteem IAT (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) and the Name Letter Test (Nuttin, 1985;
1987), found Gebauer et al.’s (2008) single-item measure to be correlated with both of
these instruments. Name-liking was also highly correlated with two other explicit
measures of global self-attitudes, including results obtained from quick responses on
explicit self-esteem indexes and under conditions of high cognitive load.
Gebauer et al. (2008) argue that name-liking is superior to the NLT as a measure
of implicit self-esteem because a) more meaning is attached to groups of letters than
individual letters, b) whole words instead of letters are stored in our memory, c) letter
order determines the meaning of an object and how it is evaluated, d) there is no other
attribute or object more closely related to the self than one’s own name, and e) according
to Gestalt psychology, the whole is generally considered to be greater than the sum of its
parts. For these reasons, the authors believe that liking of one’s own name is a more
efficient and valid measure of implicit self-esteem than the Name Letter Test. Moreover,
this single-item measure addresses some of Buhrmester, Blanton, and Swann’s (2011)
concerns with the NLT as a valid measure of implicit self-esteem. Namely, unlike the
NLT, Gebauer et al.’s (2008) measure was correlated with general well-being and explicit
self-esteem, demonstrated high test-retest reliability, and was not dependent on the order
of administration of implicit-explicit measures. In addition, name-liking is more likely
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than preferences for individual name letters to tap autobiographical information,
addressing yet another one of Buhrmester et al.’s (2011) doubts regarding the validity of
the NLT as a measure of implicit self-esteem.
Previously, Hoorens & Nuttin (1993) found differences in name-letter preferences
were associated with participants’ beliefs that their name a) would suit someone of the
opposite gender, b) would suit a member of a professional group to which they would
like to belong, and c) carried a strong likelihood of being chosen as a name for
themselves if they would have had the opportunity to so choose. Their study provides
conceptual justification for Gebauer et al.’s (2008) name-liking measure, but stopped
short of establishing it as a valid measure of implicit self-esteem. Nevertheless, their
study gives legs to the hypothesis and provides preliminary support that implicit-self
attitudes—as measured by name-liking—might influence name-letter biases. Currently,
Gebauer et al.’s (2008) measure and Hoorens and Nuttin’s (1993) findings are just the tip
of the implicit egotism iceberg. The present study explored the relationship between
implicit self-esteem and name-letter preferences more deeply by examining—as Pelham
et al. (2005) suggested—whether typical implicit egotism findings would be reversed
among those who truly possess negative self-associations, i.e., poor implicit self-esteem.
Differences in name-letter preferences were examined among participants with high and
low implicit self-esteem, as measured by Gebauer et al.’s (2008) name-liking instrument.
Thus, the proposed study sought to a) fill this important gap in implicit egotism
research by examining the role of implicit self-attitudes in biases toward name letters,
b) foster a more comprehensive understanding of the self-concept and our resulting selfbiases, and c) contribute theoretically to social psychology and research on implicit
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egotism by challenging the notion that the name letter effects observed in previous
studies are the result of an overwhelming majority of participants’ good fortune of
possessing favorable self-attitudes. By measuring implicit self-esteem, the proposed
study also aimed to determine whether a) positive self-attitudes are the norm for the
general population, b) one’s level of implicit self-esteem impacts name-letter preferences,
c) if biases toward name letters occur in general regardless of one’s level of self-esteem,
and d) if name-letter preferences are synonymous with implicit self-esteem.
Previous research has also demonstrated that name-letter biases can vary as a
function of gender, with women demonstrating stronger name letter effects than men for
their first names (Pelham et al., 2002; Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997). Therefore, another
aim of the current study was to examine whether women participants would exhibit
stronger preferences for captions submitted by writers with whom they shared a first
name initial and if they would display stronger biases toward their initial letter on the
NLT.
Another aim of the present study was to examine the effect of self-concept threats
on name-letter preferences. Based on Jones et al.’s (2002) and Brendl et al.’s (2005)
research, it was expected that participants who experienced a minor threat to the selfconcept would exhibit modestly stronger biases compared to those who received a small
boost to their self-concept. A self-concept threat was expected to serve as a motive for
participants to self-enhance when given the opportunity to evaluate captions submitted by
writers who shared their first name initial. Evidence of a name letter effect would support
implicit egotism as one of our many self-serving biases. Explicit self-esteem, as measured
by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1989), would likely moderate the effect
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of a self-concept threat. Participants high in explicit self-esteem were expected to
exhibit stronger name-letter preferences than participants with low explicit self-esteem
after experiencing the same threat. Born from the well-practiced need to self-enhance,
preferences for captions submitted by writers with whom participants shared an initial
letter would provide an opportunity for ordinarily high explicit self-esteem individuals to
regulate their recently injured self-esteem.
Krizan and Suls’ (2008) meta-analysis found the accessibility of participants’ selfattitudes influenced name-letter preferences when explicit self-esteem measures were
administered immediately prior to versus after the Name Letter Test. Specifically,
explicit self-esteem measures were found to prime positive self-evaluations before the
NLT because participants’ self-attitudes became more accessible, resulting in stronger
biases. The order of the current study’s explicit self-esteem measure would thus be
manipulated in the same fashion to test for differences in name-letter preferences between
participants with high and low self-attitude accessibility.
A final aim of the proposed study—and representing a “new twist” on implicit
egotism research—was to examine shared gender as a possible influence on name-letter
biases. Previous research has found gender-matching effects in the areas of supervisorsupervisee relationships (Worthington, Jr. & Stern, 1985) and therapist-patient treatment
outcomes (Zlotnick, Elkin, & Shea, 1998; Sterling, Gottheil, Weinstein & Serota, 1998),
but gender-matching effects have never before been examined among biases
demonstrated toward name letters. In a unique task designed to simultaneously measure
both initial-letter biases and gender-biases, participants would rate cartoon captions
ostensibly submitted by men and women writers who shared and did not share their first
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initial. Analysis of participants’ and caption writers’ gender would provide a novel test
of gender-matching as a potential influence on name-letter preferences and further
advance the study of implicit egotism with new data.
In sum, the present study sought to add to the growing body of implicit egotism
research by examining several influences (gender differences, self-attitude accessibility,
and self-concept threats) on name-letter biases using a novel paradigm. In addition, two
new variables were examined as potential influences on name-letter preferences: implicit
self-esteem and shared gender. A special emphasis was placed on teasing out the role
implicit self-attitudes play in initial-letter biases to determine if the name letter effect
reflects a universal and automatic positive self-bias or if it reflects one’s level of implicit
self-esteem, with typical implicit egotism findings possibly being reversed for
participants with negative implicit self-attitudes—an important empirical question for
future research raised by Pelham et al. (2005).
Hypotheses reflecting the current study’s aims are summarized in Table 1.
Methods for experimentally manipulating variables will be described in more detail in the
following chapter, along with descriptions of the study’s measures and their
administration.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS
Participant Recruitment
Two separate identical studies—one recruiting men and one recruiting women—
were posted simultaneously in Experimetrix, Loyola University Chicago’s web-based
psychology experiment scheduling portal. Both studies were titled “Judgments of Humor
and Language in the 21st Century” and were designed to be completed in one hour or less
as an online experiment. Respondents received one experiment participation credit hour
for completing the experiment. Recruitment of participants began at the beginning of the
fifth week of the Fall 2011 semester and lasted 11 weeks.
Sample
Participants were 503 men and women enrolled in Psychology 101 at Loyola
University Chicago. The average weekly number of respondents who signed up for and
completed the experiment was 45, range = 14 (week 11) to 74 (week 2). An average of 15
men completed the experiment each week, range = 10 (week 3) to 24 (week 10), while an
average of 29 women completed the experiment each week, range = 3 (week 11) to 57
(week 6). For weekly participant recruitment frequencies for men and women, please see
Table 2.
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Based on the appearance of traditionally feminine first and/or middle names in
Experimetrix’s participant sign-up list, at least 6 women signed up incorrectly for the
men’s version of the experiment, while no men incorrectly signed up for the women’s
version. These estimates, however, could vary when taking into account gender-neutral,
ethnic, or other types of names. Because respondents’ names could not be associated with
their surveys, these six women’s data were unable to be removed from the men’s set of
responses, however, they accounted for less than 4% of what will henceforth be
considered the (all) men participants.
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Nine participants’ data were removed because they left their surveys blank
either due to choice, a technological error, or because they closed the internet window
during the experiment. Two respondents were excluded because they disagreed to
participate in the experiment after signing up. The resulting N was 492 participants (324
women and 168 men).
Completion Times
The amount of time participants took to complete the experiment was recorded
online. On average, respondents spent 16.46 minutes completing the experiment (range =
2–624 minutes, SD = 35.76). Fourteen cases were excluded from this average because
they did not finish the experiment, thus a completion time was not recorded. Men (N =
166) on average spent 14.32 minutes completing the experiment (range = 2–198 minutes,
SD = 17.06), while women (N = 312) on average spent 17.61 minutes (range = 4–624
minutes, SD = 42.46). Even though women on average spent more than 3 minutes longer
than men completing the experiment, this difference was not statistically significant,
t(476) = .96, p = .34, d = .10.
Immediately, the minimum and maximum completion times suggest, respectively,
that some participants might not have complied with the instructions for parts or all of the
experiment, while others might not have relied on their gut feelings when instructed to do
so. It is also possible that respondents with longer completion times might have
suspended their participation and returned to the experiment at a later time. As with all
completion times, it is impossible to say which parts of the survey could have been
compromised because completion times for each page of the experiment were not
recorded.
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality for the distribution
of completion times were both significant, p < .001. Exclusion of outliers based on three
or more standard deviations was not instructive. Because the experiment was designed to
be completed well within a one-hour time frame, cases where participants took longer
than one hour to finish the experiment (N = 10, 2.1%) were considered to be potential
outliers on the completion time variable. Previous researchers, however, have refrained
from using long completion times as an exclusionary criterion, arguing that their survey
program did not record completion times for individual pages so it would be impossible
to determine on which part(s) respondents lingered, if they simply opened the survey but
began it at a another time, or if they began the survey and returned to it at a later time
(Nosen & Woody, 2008). It is worth mention that no participants contacted the
experimenter to request additional participation credit hours or to complain that the
experiment took longer than the projected (maximum) time of one hour.
Short completion times raise similar concerns as to whether respondents
conscientiously completed the experiment. Twenty-nine participants (6.1%) had
completion times of less than 7 minutes, which fell under the 10th percentile in the
distribution of respondent completion times. It is unclear as to whether meaningful
participation could occur with experiment completion times under 7 minutes. However,
because name-letter preferences reflect an automatic and highly efficient unconscious
process, shorter experiment completion times are not particularly troubling.
As a precaution, the researcher took a conservative approach and analyzed
experiment data both including and excluding data from participants with long and short
completion times. Fortunately, results were extremely similar and often identical,

30
regardless of the amount of time respondents spent completing the experiment. Thus,
results reported reflect data from the entire set of participants (N = 492).
Procedure
At the time of sign-up in Experimetrix, a hyperlink to the web study was
displayed to participants so they could click on and begin the experiment. The study
could be completed online using an internet connection from respondents’ home
computers, or if desired, from a campus computer. Experimetrix parameters were set so
that respondents could only sign up for the experiment once and participation in either the
men’s or women’s version of the web study precluded eligibility for participation in the
women’s or men’s version, respectively.
The format of the experiment was developed in Opinio, a widely-used and
Loyola-endorsed web research software tool. Loyola’s Office of Research Services
(ORS) and Information Technology Services (ITS) departments have worked in tandem
with Opinio to create specifications that secure participants’ anonymity and the data they
enter according to the highest security standards possible. Data transmitted from
respondents’ computers are encrypted and stored on the Opinio server, which is protected
inside Loyola’s perimeter firewall. Participants’ IP addresses were hidden from the
researcher.
The ITS department was able to build a randomization process into the survey
link provided to participants upon sign-up for the experiment. Clicking on the same web
URL randomly directed men respondents to one of 24 different surveys, which featured
slight differences in the order of measures and contained one of three self-concept threat
conditions. A different web URL was provided to women participants who signed up for
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the experiment, which also randomly directed them to one of 24 different surveys
featuring the same slight differences in the order of measures and contained one of three
of the men’s same threat conditions. Again, men and women participants’ experiments
were identical in content, orders of measures, and threat conditions, but were listed
separately as a means to merely eliminate the need to ask respondents to indicate their
gender within the survey.
Participants completed the online experiment anonymously, with the exception of
the identifying information of gender (determined by the version of the study they signed
up for) and their first initial (which was queried in a survey question). No other
identifying information was requested or collected from respondents.
Informed Consent
On the first webpage of the survey, participants were given information about the
nature, purpose, and type of questions that were included in the experiment. The consent
process adhered to guidelines set forth by Loyola University Chicago’s Institutional
Review Board for web-based research and used Loyola’s General Consent Form
Template. Elements included a confidentiality disclaimer, information regarding
participants’ anonymity, contact information for the primary investigator and faculty
sponsor, and respondents’ inability to retrieve or discard responses from the database
once submitted. Participation throughout the duration of the experiment was entirely
voluntary and respondents were free to refrain from answering any question(s) for any
reason or discontinue their participation in the study without penalty. Results of the study
were made available to those who requested it.
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Measures
Humor Consumption Survey
All respondents who consented to participate in the experiment first completed a
two-item survey which measured their exposure to cartoons and other humorous media.
Participants were asked to indicate how often they read cartoons in newspapers or
magazines and how often they watched humorous television shows or movies using the
provided scale of 1) every day, 2) once a week, 3) once a month, 4) a few times a year,
and 5) almost never. The purpose of this survey was to help disguise the study’s
hypotheses and to help frame the experiment as a study of humor and language.
Self-Esteem Threat Manipulation
Following an experimental manipulation used by Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, and
Mirenberg (2002), participants were randomly assigned to surveys containing one of
three conditions: a self-concept threat, affirmation, or control writing task. In the selfconcept threat condition, respondents were asked to write at least three sentences about
an aspect of themselves that they have found difficult to change, but would like to be
different. Participants in the self-concept affirmation condition were asked to write at
least three sentences about an important area of their lives in which they have always felt
good about themselves and represented a positive, important, and stable aspect of who
they are. Finally, respondents in the control condition were simply asked to write at least
three sentences about the last movie they saw. The purpose of this component of the
experiment was to deliver a mild threat to participants’ self-concept and compare their
name-letter preferences with the other two experimental conditions.
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Post-Manipulation Mood
Subsequent to the self-concept threat, affirmation, or control manipulation, all
participants were asked to complete a brief mood questionnaire to ensure that observed
differences in initial-letter biases could be attributable to the threat manipulation, instead
of due to a manipulation of mood. The questionnaire was identical to the one used by
Jones et al. (2002) for this same purpose and consisted of two items which asked
respondents to indicate their current mood and how they were feeling at the current
moment using the scale of 1) extremely sad to 7) extremely happy.
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
Next, one-half of participants were randomly assigned to complete the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1989), a brief widely-used measure of self-reported
(“explicit”) self-esteem. It consists of 10 items which assess general self-value and selfworth. The remaining half of participants completed the measure at the end of the study
as a means to vary self-attitude accessibility and to examine its impact on initial-letter
biases. Please see Appendix A for the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES).
Initial-Letter Biases
Participants were next shown two randomly-selected cartoons licensed from The
New Yorker magazine’s “cartoon caption contest” collection, along with 20 different
possible captions for each cartoon. More than one million people have entered their
caption submissions for the over 300 contests the magazine has held since the
competition was first introduced in 2005. All of the several thousand captions submitted
for each weekly contest are publicly viewable online, however the identity of caption
writers are kept anonymous. Names of caption writers are only included with their
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submissions when they are selected as one of three finalists by the cartoon editorial
staff for each week’s cartoon. The public then votes on the top three entries, and based on
these votes, a winner is chosen. As a “mock” version of the magazine’s cartoon caption
contest, participants were asked to play the role of a “judge” and evaluate 20 captions
provided for each of the two cartoons (40 captions in total).
Captions for the cartoons were selected from the thousands of submissions posted
online according to the following criteria: a) they referenced the juxtaposition of the two
opposing elements featured in the cartoon, b) they were grammatically and semantically
correct, and c) they were short in length, i.e., approximately 10–12 words. While the
humor and interpretation of each caption would be largely subjective, adhering to the
above criteria ensured that a) the captions resembled typical cartoon captions, b) they
could be read quickly, and c) they were brief enough to allow participants to compare
multiple captions when assigning ratings, if desired. Respondents were asked to
individually and quickly rate each set of 20 captions using the scale of 1) not at all
humorous to 7) extremely humorous, while using their “gut feelings.”
Importantly, fictitious caption writers’ names were referred to as “students who
submitted each caption,” with caption writers’ names printed in bold beside each caption.
Emboldening the names served to highlight the writers’ names, while placing the names
in a prominent position, i.e., “flush left” and preceding each caption, helped to further
emphasize and draw attention to writers’ names while participants were evaluating
captions and making their ratings. These methods were used in a concerted effort to help
ensure that participants attended to caption writers’ names. However, because previous
researchers have found name letter effects even when using subliminal (13.7 millisecond)
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name-letter targets (Jones et al., 2004), whether participants attended to name-letter
stimuli in the current study was not an immediate concern.
Each caption was randomly assigned a fictitious “submitted by” name that began
with a different letter of the alphabet, with the exception of the letters O, Q, U, X, Y, and
Z. These six letters were omitted because a) they are the rarest first name initials
according to recent Census data (census.gov/genealogy/names/), b) asking participants to
rate 26 captions might have revealed the hypotheses of the study, c) including all 26
letters would have increased the length of the task and experiment, while d) requiring
participants to rate a large, uncommon, and potentially unwieldy number of items. The
caption-rating task was a unique method designed to simultaneously allow measurement
of name-letter preferences while also manipulating the gender of caption writers. In this
way, the current investigation became the first implicit egotism study to examine both
types of biases in tandem.
Arrangement of captions could not be completely randomized using the survey
software technology, so instead participants were randomly assigned to one of four
cartoon caption order presentations: forward order for Cartoons 1 and 2; forward order
for Cartoon 1 and backward order for Cartoon 2; backward order for Cartoon 1 and
forward order for Cartoon 2; and backward order for Cartoons 1 and 2. Within these
caption arrangements, the first letter of caption writers’ names (one name each for the
letters A–Z, with the exceptions of O, Q, U, X, Y, and Z) were randomly positioned for
Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2. Gender of fictitious caption writers (10 men and 10 women),
were randomly assigned for Cartoon 1, with the opposite gender assigned to that initial-
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letter for Cartoon 2. Please refer to Appendix B for the two cartoons used in the study,
with sets of captions presented in “forward” arrangement order for both cartoons.
Hypothesis Awareness Questionnaire
After the caption-rating exercise, respondents completed an “influences on humor
judgments” questionnaire as a test of hypothesis awareness. The questionnaire probed
whether participants were aware of any role the similarity between their names and the
caption writers’ might have played in their caption preferences and ratings. Respondents
were asked to indicate anything that might have influenced their humor ratings in the
preceding task by choosing one or more of the following variables: the cleverness of the
caption’s language; the caption writer’s interpretation of the drawing; their individual
sense of humor; the number of cartoons they read per week; the number of humorous
television shows or films they watch per week; and a variable marked “other,” along with
text space to type in a potential influence that was not already listed.
Name Letter Test
Next, respondents completed the traditional Name Letter Test (NLT), which was
described as a survey of “aesthetic judgments of lexical stimuli.” Because letter order
could not be randomized for each participant, letters were displayed in one random fixed
order for all respondents. Participants were asked to estimate how beautiful they found
each of the 26 letters of the alphabet using their “gut feelings.” It was explained that even
though it might seem unusual to evaluate letters in terms of their beauty, previous
research studying these types of evaluations has fostered “a better understanding of
language and human emotions.” Please see Appendix C for a copy of the NLT.
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Implicit Self-Esteem Measure
After the NLT, participants completed Gebauer, Riketta, Broemer, and Maio’s
(2008) single-item measure of implicit self-esteem. This measure asks respondents to
simply indicate how much they like their full name in total (including their first and last
name together) using the scale 1) not at all to 7) very much. It was purposely
administered after the humor judgments exercise and NLT so as not to raise participants’
suspicion that their name might play a role in or otherwise influence their preferences for
cartoon captions and evaluations of alphabet letters.
Self-Attitude Accessibility
Finally, to conclude the experiment, the remaining half of participants randomly
assigned to the “low self-attitude accessibility” condition completed the RSES at this
time. The other half of respondents who were randomly assigned to the “high self-attitude
accessibility” condition had already completed this portion of the experiment prior to the
humor judgments exercise. For participants in the “high self-attitude accessibility”
condition, the experiment concluded after they completed the single-item implicit selfesteem measure described above. The experiment concluded for the “low self-attitude
accessibility” participants upon completion of the RSES.
Debriefing
All respondents were debriefed at the end of the experiment and were given
additional information about the study’s purpose, which was described as an investigation
of self-related biases in humor judgments and aesthetic evaluations of letters of the
alphabet. The debriefing statement explained that although some judgments and
evaluations are often largely subjective, research on implicit egotism has shown that
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people sometimes make both everyday and important decisions based on their
preferences for self-related attributes, including one’s name letters.
Respondents were made aware of the different experimental conditions to which
they were randomly assigned. It was explained that these conditions consisted of
measures developed to assess self-esteem and contained tasks designed to briefly deliver
a mild threat or affirmation to their self-concept, or a control condition. Hypotheses
underlying these manipulations were offered and participants were urged to refrain from
discussing the experiment with other students.
Participants interested in learning more about implicit egotism were provided with
a brief introductory-level journal article on the topic, which was accessible from Loyola
University Chicago’s e-journal database. They were also given email addresses for the
Primary Investigator and her Faculty Sponsor, should they have any complaints,
concerns, or questions about the study they participated in.

CHAPTER 4
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
Humor Consumption
Respondents were first asked about their frequency of humor consumption in
order to frame the study as one assessing judgments of humor and to help disguise the
hypotheses of the experiment. All participants (N = 492) indicated how often they read
cartoons in newspapers or magazines by choosing one of the following responses: every
day (N = 11), once a week (N = 86), once a month (N = 105), a few times a year (N =
136), or almost never (N = 154).
Next, participants indicated how often they watched humorous television shows
or movies by choosing from the same set of responses: every day (N = 165), once a week
(N = 264), once a month (N = 45), a few times a year (N = 13), or almost never (N = 5).
Although respondents’ consumption of humor was not of particular interest to this study
and the purpose of these two questions was merely to “frame” the study as one examining
judgments of humor, reported vs. expected frequencies of reading cartoons and watching
humorous television shows or movies were significantly different, !2 = 26.71, df = 16,
p < .05, which is considered a small- to medium-sized effect, w2 = .05 (Cohen, 1988).
Hypothesis Awareness
The researcher probed for hypothesis awareness after participants completed the
humor judgments exercise. Respondents were asked to choose one or more variables that
might have influenced their caption ratings from the following list: the cleverness of the
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captions’ language, the caption writers’ interpretations of the drawing, the participant’s
individual sense of humor, the number of cartoons he or she typically reads per week, and
the number of humorous television shows or films watched per week, along with an
“other” variable. If “other” was selected, respondents were asked to describe any
additional variables that might have influenced their ratings that were not already listed.
A blank text field was provided for respondents to list these additional variables.
Participants’ individual sense of humor was the most frequently chosen variable
as a possible influence on their previous cartoon caption ratings (N = 424), followed by
the cleverness of the captions’ language (N = 395), the caption writers’ interpretations of
the drawing (N = 297), and the number of humorous television shows or films
respondents watched per week (N = 55). The number of cartoons participants read per
week (N = 22) and “other” (N = 22) were the least frequently chosen influences. Analysis
of “other” variables provided by respondents revealed neither an awareness of shared
initials with caption writers as a possible influence on their caption ratings, nor any of the
study’s other hypotheses. Responses when indicated (N = 21) included variables such as
“puns,” the “caption writer’s originality,” “irony,” and the “ability to use common
language to create a joke.” Based on respondents’ lack of awareness of the potential role
shared initials with caption writers might have played in their judgments of humor, the
researcher can conclude that a) the hypotheses of the experiment were not known or
discovered by participants and b) any preferences that emerged toward initial-letter
stimuli were implicit because they occurred outside of respondents’ awareness.

CHAPTER 5
PRIMARY ANALYSES OF INITIAL-LETTER BIASES
The Name Letter Test
Initial-letter biases on the Name Letter Test (NLT) were computed using an
ipsatized scoring algorithm (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009; Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer,
2004), which is a conservative approach to computing name-letter preferences because it
double-corrects name-letter ratings at both the individual level and at the group level.
First, the mean rating a participant assigned to all non-initial letters is subtracted from
each of his or her letter ratings, including his or her initial letter. Next, normative letter
baseline ratings for each letter are calculated by averaging the ipsatized letter ratings
assigned by participants who did not have the letter as an initial. The final step involves
subtracting the normative ipsatized baseline rating for a participant’s initial letter from
their ipsatized rating of that letter to obtain his or her “initial-letter bias.” SPSS syntax for
computing initial-letter biases with the I-algorithm (along with other algorithms) was
obtained from Dr. LeBel’s University of Western Ontario research website (2011).
Computations were randomly and manually confirmed for accuracy, and were also
confirmed exhaustively with Microsoft Excel.
For example, 420 participants rated the letter “A” from 1) not at all beautiful to
(7) extremely beautiful. Of these, 55 participants’ first initial was “A,” so normative
baselines were derived from the average of the 365 remaining non-initial matching
participants’ ipsatized ratings for the letter “A.” Then, this normative ipsatized baseline
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rating for the letter “A” was subtracted from each participant’s ipsatized rating for the
letter “A” whose name began with that letter, with the result yielding their “initial-letter
bias.” Please see Table 3 for a list of normative ipsatized baseline ratings, mean ipsatized
ratings by initial-matching participants, and mean initial-letter biases for all 26 letters of
the alphabet.
Out of the 492 total respondents, 420 (150 men and 270 women) provided their
first initial for their first given name and had non-missing and non-redundant letter
ratings on the Name Letter Test (NLT). Using the I-algorithm, results showed that
participants displayed a very strong bias toward their own initial letters. The average
difference between participants’ ipsatized ratings for their initial-letter and the normative
ipsatized baseline value for that letter was +1.38 (range = –3.43–6.05, SD = 1.63), which
was statistically significant, t(419) = 17.28, p < .001. This effect is considered large, d =
.84, and is consistent with the medium to large effects found in recent studies on the
name letter effect (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009). In sum, when it came to rating one’s first
initial letter on the NLT, participants increased their ratings an average of 1.38 points on
the 1) not at all beautiful to 7) extremely beautiful scale, relative to their average rating
for non-initials and the corresponding normative ipsatized baseline rating for their initial.
Inspection of individual NLT scores that were three standard deviations below the
mean (scores less than or equal to –3.52) and three standard deviations above the mean
(scores greater than or equal to +6.27) produced no outliers. Examination of Tukey box
plots, however, identified two potential outliers—one with an NLT score of –3.43 and
one with an NLT score of +6.05. Removing them produced an identical average initial-
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letter bias of +1.38 (range = –2.83–5.64, SD = 1.60), which was also again significant
t(417) = 17.56, p < .001, d = 86. Because excluding these two respondents’ data
produced identical results, all participants were included in subsequent NLT analyses.
Initial-Letter Biases in Humor Judgments
Cartoon 1
Biases toward captions written by writers who shared participants’ first initials
were computed in the same manner as initial-letter biases on the NLT, i.e., using the Ialgorithm (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009; Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004). Results are
based on data from respondents with complete and non-redundant ratings for the entire
set of twenty Cartoon 1 captions, and those whose initial letter matched one of the twenty
caption writers’ initials (N = 428).
The average initial-letter bias exhibited toward captions was +.18 (range = –3.46–
5.09, SD = 1.59). When it came to judging captions written by writers with whom
participants shared a first initial, respondents on average increased their ratings by almost
two-tenths of a point on the 1) not at all humorous to 7) extremely humorous scale,
relative to ratings of captions written by non-initial matching writers and as compared to
normative ipsatized baseline caption ratings. While this observed initial-letter bias was
significant, t(427) = 2.35, p = .02 (two-tailed), the effect was small, d = .11. For a list of
normative ipsatized baselines, mean ipsatized ratings by initial-matching participants, and
mean initial-letter biases for Cartoon 1 captions, please refer to Table 4.
Cartoon 2
Biases toward captions written by writers who shared respondents’ first initials
were again computed using the I-algorithm (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009; Baccus, Baldwin,
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& Packer, 2004). Results are based on participants with complete and non-redundant
ratings for the entire set of twenty Cartoon 2 captions and those whose initial letter
matched one of the twenty caption writers’ initials (N = 429).
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The average bias exhibited toward Cartoon 2 captions was +.10 (range = –
3.81–4.47, SD = 1.48). When it came to rating captions written by writers with whom
participants shared a first initial, respondents on average increased their ratings by onetenth of a point on the 1) not at all humorous to 7) extremely humorous scale, relative to
their ratings of captions written by non-initial matching writers and as compared to
normative ipsatized baseline ratings. While in the predicted direction, this bias did not
reach statistical significance, t(428) = 1.35, p = .18 (two-tailed), d = .07. For a list of
normative ipsatized baselines, mean ipsatized ratings by initial-matching participants, and
mean initial-letter biases for Cartoon 2 captions, please refer to Table 5.
Both Cartoons
Participants demonstrated a statistically significant bias toward Cartoon 1
captions submitted by writers with whom they shared an initial letter. A similar effect
was observed for Cartoon 2 captions, however this bias failed to reach statistical
significance. After considering caption ratings for Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 separately,
initial-letter biases were averaged together across both sets of captions. Data from
respondents who shared an initial with caption writers and who had complete and nonredundant caption ratings for both Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 were included in analyses
(N = 394). Participants’ average initial-letter biases were computed by the I-algorithm
(LeBel & Gawronski, 2009; Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004).
The average bias exhibited across both sets of captions was +.15 (range = –2.46–
3.12, SD = 1.08). When it came to judging captions written by writers with whom
participants shared a first initial, respondents on average increased their ratings by .15
points on the 1) not at all humorous to 7) extremely humorous scale, relative to their
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ratings of captions written by non-initial matching writers and as compared to
normative ipsatized baseline ratings. When biases were averaged together for Cartoon 1
and Cartoon 2, biases exhibited toward captions written by same-initial writers were
statistically significant, t(393) = 2.67, p = .01 (two-tailed). This effect, however, is
considered small, d = .14.
Nickname Initial-Letter Biases
At the conclusion of the experiment, respondents were asked to indicate the first
initial letter of their first given name for use in name-letter preferences analyses. Because
people oftentimes “go by” a name other than their first given name, participants were
asked to indicate if that was the case, and if so, what the first initial of that name was. Of
the 492 participants, 62 indicated that they “went by” another name with a different
initial than their first given name, while 403 respondents confirmed that the name they
“went by” began with the initial letter they already indicated for their first given name.
Twenty-seven respondents did not answer this “nickname” question, either
because they discontinued the experiment prematurely or because they chose not to
respond to this item. The purpose of the follow-up nickname question was to confirm that
participants indeed “went by” their first given name initial in order to accurately identify
the target of bias for name-letter preferences analyses. In so doing, an opportunity was
presented to examine nickname initial biases separately and as distinct from first given
name initial biases, becoming the first implicit egotism study to pursue this
differentiation in name-letter targets.
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The Name Letter Test (Nickname Initial)
Nickname-initial analyses were based on 58 respondents who reported a
nickname initial and had complete, non-redundant letter ratings on the NLT. Biases for
nickname analyses were computed using the I-algorithm (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009;
Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004). The average NLT bias based on participants’
nickname initial was +.36 (range = –3.61–3.72, SD = 1.76). When it came to rating
nickname initial letters, participants on average increased their ratings by over one-third
of a point on the 1) not at all beautiful to 7) extremely beautiful scale, relative to their
ratings of non-nickname initials and as compared to normative ipsatized baseline ratings.
This bias, however, did not reach significance, t(57) = 1.55, p = .13 (two-tailed), and the
effect was small, d = .20.
Cartoon 1 (Nickname Initial)
Initial-letter biases for participants with nicknames were also computed using the
I-algorithm (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009; Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004). Analyses
were based on 51 respondents who reported a nickname initial and had complete, nonredundant caption ratings for Cartoon 1. The average nickname initial bias exhibited was
–.38 (range = –3.78–3.80, SD = 1.81). Interestingly, when it came to rating captions
submitted by writers who shared participants’ nickname initial, respondents on average
decreased their ratings by over one-third of a point on the 1) not at all humorous to 7)
extremely humorous scale, relative to their ratings of captions written by non-nickname
initial writers and as compared to normative ipsatized baseline ratings. This (negative)
bias exhibited toward nickname-initial caption writers was in the opposite direction
predicted and was nonsignificant, t(50) = –1.52, p = .14 (two-tailed), d = –.20.

50
Cartoon 2 (Nickname Initial)
Initial-letter biases for participants with nicknames were again computed using
the I-algorithm (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009; Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004). Analyses
were based on 49 respondents who reported a nickname initial and had complete, nonredundant caption ratings for Cartoon 2. The average nickname initial-letter bias
exhibited by participants was –.08 (range = –3.58–3.02, SD = 1.30). Consistent with the
negative biases observed toward Cartoon 1 nickname-initial writers’ captions,
participants again on average decreased their ratings by nearly one-tenth of a point on the
1) not at all humorous to 7) extremely humorous scale, relative to their ratings of captions
written by non-nickname initial writers and as compared to normative baseline ratings.
Again, this negative bias was opposite to the direction predicted and nonsignificant, t(48)
= –.41, p = .68 (two-tailed), d = –.06.
Both Cartoons (Nickname Initial)
Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 nickname initial biases were again negative when
averaged together across both sets of cartoon caption ratings (N = 45, M = –.30, range =
–3.30–1.98, SD = 1.03). This effect was opposite to the direction predicted and,
interestingly, was actually significant, t(44) = –1.98, p = .05 (two-tailed), d = –.29.
“Pure” First Given Name Letter Biases
Savvy readers will have noted that previous analyses of initial-letter preferences
reflected biases toward first given name initials, irrespective of the name respondents
reported they “went by.” After separating participants who indicated they “went by”
another name with a different initial letter in their own analysis (see preceding
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“nickname” analyses), the researcher next re-analyzed the original initial-letter
preference scores excluding participants who went by a different or “nickname” initial
letter.
This was done for two reasons. First, initial-letter biases were vastly different
between these two samples. Secondly, the original larger analysis examined first given
name initial-letter biases among respondents who did and did not go by a name that
began with this target letter. Therefore, nicknamed participants were excluded in a
follow-up analysis to determine whether a “pure” subset of respondents who indeed went
by their first given name would demonstrate even stronger biases when data was not
muddled by noise from nicknamed participants.
The Name Letter Test (NLT)
Out of the 420 participants in the original NLT analysis, 58 respondents were
excluded because they indicated they went by a name and initial that was different from
that of their first given name. Twelve additional participants were excluded because they
did not answer the question or confirm their first given name initial. A follow-up analysis
of NLT biases toward respondent-confirmed first given name initials included 350
participants.
The average initial-letter bias was +1.42 for this subset of respondents (range =
–2.83–6.05, SD = 1.61). When it came to ratings of participants’ first initials for their
first given name, participants rated that initial letter 1.42 points higher on the
attractiveness scale, relative to non-initials and as compared to normative baselines. This
observed bias was significant, t(349) = 16.44, p < .001, and the effect is considered large,
d = .88. Recall that this bias is very similar to the one demonstrated by the larger set of
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respondents (N = 420), which was based on first given name initial targets of
participants who both went by their first given name and those who went by a different
name that began with a different letter, +1.38 (range = –3.43–6.05, SD = 1.63), t(419) =
17.28, p < .001, d = .84. Based on previous and follow-up analyses of NLT scores, one
can argue that initial-letter biases are relevant to first given name initials only, even when
a person “goes by” another name beginning with a different letter.
Cartoon 1
Follow-up analyses of Cartoon 1 initial-letter biases were also conducted to
determine whether a “pure” subset of participants who indeed “went by” their first given
name (and the target initial used in the computation of previous initial-letter biases)
would demonstrate these biases after excluding respondents who went by a name other
than their first given one (and thus a different target initial that was used in the analysis).
Out of the 428 participants in the original Cartoon 1 analysis, 54 respondents were
excluded because they indicated they went by a name and initial that was different from
their first given name. Thirteen additional participants were excluded because they did
not answer the question or confirm their first given name initial. Follow-up analyses of
Cartoon 1 initial-letter biases included 361 respondents who confirmed that they “went
by” their first given name.
The average initial-letter bias exhibited by this subset of participants was +.16
(range = –3.46–5.09, SD = 1.61). When it came to rating captions submitted by writers
who shared their first initial of their first given name, respondents rated that caption .16
points higher on the humor scale, relative to captions submitted by writers who did not
share their first given name initial and as compared to normative baselines. This finding
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was marginally significant, t(360) = 1.89, p = .06 (two-tailed) and the effect is
considered very small, d = .10. Recall that these results were similar in findings for the
larger set of participants, which included those who both went by their first given name
and those who went by a nickname (N = 428). Their average initial-letter bias was +.18
(range = –3.46–5.09, SD = 1.59), which was significant, t(427) = 2.35, p = .02 (twotailed) and effect sizes for both samples were small and nearly identical, d = .11. Based
on previous and follow-up analyses of Cartoon 1 caption ratings, one can again argue that
initial-letter biases are relevant to first given name initials only—even when a person
“goes by” another name beginning with a different letter.
Cartoon 2
Out of the 429 participants from the original Cartoon 2 analysis, 53 respondents
were excluded because they indicated they went by a name and initial that was different
from their first given name. Twelve additional participants were excluded because they
did not answer the question or confirm their first given name initial. Follow-up analyses
of Cartoon 2 initial-letter biases based on respondent-confirmed first given name initials
included 364 participants who indicated they “went by” their first given name.
The new average initial-letter bias was +.13 (range = –3.81–4.47, SD = 1.50).
When it came to rating captions submitted by writers who shared their first initial of their
first given name, participants rated that caption .13 points higher on the humor scale
relative to captions submitted by writers who did not share their first given name initial,
and as compared to normative baselines. This finding, although in the direction predicted,
did not reach statistical significance, t(363) = 1.66, p = .10 (two-tailed), d = .09. Recall
that these results are similar in findings to those found among the larger set of
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participants (N = 429), which examined biases toward initials for respondents who
both went by their first given name and those who went by a nickname, +.10 (range = –
3.81–4.47, SD = 1.48), t(428) = 1.35, p = .18, two-tailed, d = .07.
Based on previous and follow-up analyses of Cartoon 2 initial-letter biases (and
although nonsignificant), one can again argue that these biases were relevant to first
given name initials only, even when a person “went by” another name beginning with a
different letter.
Both Cartoons
This follow-up analysis was based on 333 respondents who indicated that they
“went by” their first given name. Out of the 394 participants from the original analysis,
49 were excluded because they indicated they went by a name and initial that was
different from their first given name. Twelve additional respondents were excluded
because they did not answer the question or confirm their first given name initial letter.
The average initial-letter bias for this subset of participants was +.15 (range = –
2.19–3.12, SD = 1.09). When it came to rating captions submitted by writers who shared
their first initial of their first given name, respondents rated that caption .15 points higher
on the humor scale, relative to captions submitted by writers who did not share their first
given name initial and as compared to normative baseline ratings. This observed bias was
significant, t(332) = 2.47, p = .01 (two-tailed), d = .14. Recall that this bias was identical
to the first given name initial-letter bias exhibited by the larger sample of participants (N
= 394), which included those who went by their first given name, as well as those who
went by a nickname (M = +.15, range = –2.46–3.12, SD = 1.08). This original initial-
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letter bias was also statistically significant, t(393) = 2.67, p = .01 (two-tailed), and the
magnitude of the effect was identical, d = .14.
In sum, based on previous and follow-up analyses of biases exhibited on the NLT,
Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 (individually and when averaged together), the findings of this
study suggest that initial-letter biases are relevant to first given name initials only, even
when a person “goes by” another name beginning with a different initial. Moreover,
biases toward nickname initials were reduced and nonsignificant on the NLT, and were
negative on the cartoon caption rating task (which were statistically significant when
averaged together for Cartoon 1 and 2).

CHAPTER 6
EXPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM AND SELF-CONCEPT THREAT CONDITIONS
Explicit self-esteem was measured using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
(RSES; Rosenberg, 1989), a widely used ten-item self-report index that assesses
respondents’ overall level of self-value and self-worth. Both the timing of the RSES
administration and its scores were examined in relation to initial-letter preferences. For
the 474 participants who completed all ten items on the RSES, the average score was
20.72 (range = 5–30, SD = 5.02), based on a total possible score of 30 with 3 points for
each question. Half of the items (#1, #3, #4, #7, and #10) are scored as follows: “strongly
agree” = 3 points, “agree” = 2 points, “disagree” = 1 point, and “strongly disagree” = 0
points. The remaining half of items (#2, #5, #6, #8, and #9) are reversed in valence and
scored as: “strongly agree” = 0 points, “agree” = 1 point, “disagree” = 2 points, and
“strongly disagree” = 3 points. For a list of RSES items, please refer to Appendix A.
Explicit Self-Esteem Gender Differences
For men (N = 161), the average RSES score was 21.22 (range = 7–30, SD = 4.94)
and for women (N = 313), the average score was 20.47 (range = 5–30, SD = 5.05).
Differences in men’s and women’s explicit self-esteem were not statistically significant,
t(472) = 1.54, p = .13 (two-tailed), d = .15.
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Explicit Self-Esteem and Initial-Letter Biases
The influence of explicit self-esteem on initial-letter biases was next examined as
a continuous variable (total score on the RSES) for those with complete data on this
measure. First, initial-letter biases demonstrated on the Name Letter Test (NLT) were
regressed on RSES scores.
The Name Letter Test
Explicit self-esteem, as measured by RSES scores, did not predict differences in
NLT biases based on first given name initials, R2 = .001, F(1, 408) = .34, p = .56. It also
failed to predict NLT biases in analyses based on nickname initials, R2 = .002, F(1, 55) =
.13, p = .72.
Cartoon Caption Ratings
When initial-letter preferences for Cartoon 1 were regressed on RSES scores,
explicit self-esteem approached significance as a predictor of biases exhibited toward
captions written by writers who shared participants’ first given name initial, R2 = .01,
F(1, 417) = 3.26, p = .07. Explicit self-esteem was not a significant predictor of Cartoon
1 initial-letter biases when analyses were based on respondents’ nickname initial, R2 =
.01, F(1, 48) = .28, p = .60.
Cartoon 2 initial-letter preference scores were also regressed on RSES scores, but
explicit self-esteem—as measured by total RSES scores—did not predict biases exhibited
toward captions written by writers who shared participants’ first given name initial, R2 =
.003, F(1, 419) = 1.22, p = .27, or nickname initial, R2 = .03, F(1, 47) = 1.49, p = .23.
When initial-letter biases were averaged together for Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2,
explicit self-esteem was not a significant predictor of biases demonstrated toward
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captions submitted by writers who shared respondents’ first given name initials,
however, it did approach significance, R2 = .01, F(1, 385) = 3.33, p = .07. Explicit selfesteem did not predict average Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 initial-letter biases when
analyses were based on participants’ nickname initial, R2 = .03, F(1, 43) = 1.27, p = .26.
Threat Condition Manipulation Check
A total of 492 men and women respondents were randomly assigned to complete
a brief writing task in one of three different experimental conditions: self-concept threat
(N = 158); self-concept affirmation (N = 163); or a control condition (N = 171). The
researcher evaluated participants’ responses to the writing task in the three different
threat conditions according to a) the number of sentences written, b) whether they
followed directions, and c) whether they provided complete responses.
Recall that following Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, and Hetts (2002), participants
who were randomly assigned to the self-concept threat condition were asked to write at
least three sentences about an aspect of themselves that they have found difficult to
change and would like to be different. The aspect should have reflected something
important about themselves that they wished they could change, but have not been able
to. In the self-concept affirmation condition, respondents were asked to write at least
three sentences about an important area of their life where they have always felt good
about themselves, which represents a positive, important, and stable aspect of who they
are. Finally, participants randomly assigned to the control condition were asked to simply
write at least three sentences about the last movie they saw.
On average, respondents wrote 3.19 sentences (range = 1–7, SD = .67), based on
486 participants who completed the writing task for one of the three experimental
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conditions. Of these, 469 participants wrote at least three sentences as instructed, 10
wrote only two sentences, and 7 respondents wrote just one sentence. Further analysis of
the content of responses revealed that 461 participants wrote at least three sentences that
were relevant to the threat condition to which they were assigned, 17 participants wrote
less than three relevant and complete sentences, 4 did not follow the instructions1 and
another 4 respondents had misaligned or duplicate data. Only those participants who
followed directions by writing at least three sentences on a topic relevant to the
experimental condition to which they were assigned were included in self-concept threat
analyses (N = 461).
A one-way ANOVA was performed to determine whether the number of
sentences respondents wrote significantly differed between the experimental conditions.
Participants randomly assigned to the self-concept threat condition (N = 143) wrote an
average of 3.20 sentences (SD = .51). Those randomly assigned to the self-concept
affirmation condition (N = 154) wrote an almost identical number of sentences (M = 3.19,
SD = .59), while participants randomly assigned to the control condition (N = 164) wrote
an average of 3.32 sentences (SD = .67). Differences in the average number of sentences
written among the three threat conditions approached significance, F(2, 458) = 2.66, p =
.07, !2 = .01, with participants in the control condition (who were asked to write about a
recent movie they saw) writing the most number of sentences.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"!All 4 of these participants were in the self-concept threat condition and instead of writing about a
personal flaw, they either a) put a positive spin on a shortcoming or b) indicated that there was nothing
about themselves that they wished to change. Neither of these outcomes represented a threat to the selfconcept, and thus these respondents’ data were not included in threat analyses.!
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Subsequent to the writing task, respondents were asked to rate their current
mood and how they were feeling at the present moment using a scale from 1) extremely
negative to 7) extremely positive (Jones et al., 2002). Two participants did not answer
both questions, so they were excluded from analyses. The average rating given by
participants across conditions was 4.92 for self-assessments of current mood (N = 459,
range = 1–7, SD = 1.08) and 4.72 for self-assessments of how they were currently feeling
(N = 459, range = 1–7, SD = 1.15).
On average, participants who were randomly assigned to the self-concept threat
condition and completed the mood item (N = 142) rated their current mood a 4.80 (range
= 1–7, SD = 1.13). Those assigned to the self-concept affirmation condition (N = 154)
rated their current mood a 4.93 (range = 2–7, SD = 1.10), and the average rating for
participants in the control condition (N = 163) was 5.01 (range = 2–7, SD = 1.00). A oneway ANOVA did not reveal any significant differences between the average mood
ratings assigned by respondents in the self-concept threat, affirmation, or control
conditions, F(2, 456) = 1.37, p = .25, !2 = .006.
Participants in the self-concept threat condition assigned an average rating of 4.64
(range = 1–7, SD = 1.11) to how they were feeling at the current moment. Those in the
self-concept affirmation condition, on average, rated how they were currently feeling a
4.72 (range 2–7, SD = 1.15), while those in the control condition had an average rating of
4.78 (range = 1–7, SD = 1.19). A one-way ANOVA again did not reveal any significant
differences in how respondents in the different experimental conditions rated they were
currently feeling, F(2, 456) = .55, p = .58, !2 = .002. Based on analyses of the two items

61
in the mood questionnaire, one can infer that the experimental manipulation was a
valid threat to the self-concept, instead of merely a manipulation of mood.
The Name Letter Test
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions
Respondents who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat
condition to which they were randomly assigned and those with complete data on the
Name Letter Test (NLT) were included in these first analyses (N = 396). The average
initial-letter bias on the NLT for these participants was +1.34 (range = –3.43–5.64, SD =
1.63).
Participants in the self-concept threat condition (N = 119) had an average NLT
bias of +1.41 (range = –2.83–5.42, SD = 1.60). Those assigned to the self-concept
affirmation condition (N = 132) demonstrated an average bias of +1.29 (range = –2.79–
4.88, SD = 1.66), while respondents assigned to the control condition (N = 145) exhibited
an average bias of +1.34 (range = –3.43–5.64, SD = 1.64). A one-way ANOVA was used
to test for differences in NLT initial-letter biases between the three threat conditions and
was nonsignificant, F(2, 393) = .16, p = .86, !2 = .0008.
Interaction of Threat Condition " Explicit Self-Esteem
To examine whether the regression of NLT biases on threat condition varied as a
function of participants’ explicit self-esteem scores, the researcher next used Aiken &
West’s (1991) methods for testing for interactions. This analysis was based on data from
respondents who completed the NLT, threat condition writing task, and those with
complete data on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES). The average initial-letter bias
for this group of participants (N = 388) was +1.33 (range = –3.43–5.64, SD = 1.62).
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First, each participant’s RSES score was centered by subtracting the sample
mean from each score. The RSES sample mean was 20.74 (range 5–30, SD = 5.03) for
this analysis. Next, threat condition was dummy-coded with the control group serving as
the comparison group. A regression analysis was performed to test the b1 coefficient,
which compared the means for the control and self-concept threat conditions, and the b2
coefficient, which compared the means for the control and self-concept affirmation
conditions. Results were similar in findings and logic to the one-way ANOVA reported
above, i.e., threat condition did not predict NLT biases, R2 = .001, F(2, 385) = .11, p =
.89.
Next, the effect of explicit self-esteem as measured by centered RSES scores was
added to the multiple regression equation. RSES scores did not help predict NLT initialletter biases when added to the model, R2change = .000, F(1, 384) = .01, p = .91. Finally,
the interactions of RSES scores and the two threat condition comparisons were added to
the model to determine whether NLT biases, when regressed on threat condition, varied
as a function of explicit self-esteem. The overall model including the dummy variables
(threat conditions), continuous variable (centered RSES scores), and their interactions
was nonsignificant, R2 = .008, F(5, 382) = .60, p = .70. Joint tests of the b4 and b5
coefficients (corresponding to the interaction of the self-concept threat vs. control
condition ! RSES scores, and the interaction of the self-concept affirmation vs. control
condition ! RSES scores, respectively), did not significantly improve the multiple
regression model, R2change = .007, F(2, 382) = 1.39, p = .25.
In sum, when initial-letter biases exhibited on the NLT were regressed on threat
condition, biases did not vary as a function of participants’ explicit self-esteem. Because
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there was no presence of an interaction between threat conditions and RSES scores, a
simple slopes test to examine the nature of an interaction was not warranted. Please refer
to Table 6 for the progression of the multiple regression equations regressing NLT biases
on threat condition as a function of explicit self-esteem.
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Cartoon 1 Initial-Letter Biases
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions
Respondents who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat
condition to which they were randomly assigned and those with complete ratings for the
entire set of Cartoon 1 captions were included in these first analyses (N = 404). The
average Cartoon 1 initial-letter bias for these participants was +.20 (range = –3.46–5.09,
SD = 1.58).
Participants in the self-concept threat condition (N = 126) demonstrated an
average bias of +.25 (range = –3.39–3.49, SD = 1.49). Those assigned to the self-concept
affirmation condition (N = 133) exhibited an average bias of +.13 (range = –3.46–4.44,
SD = 1.62), while participants assigned to the control condition (N = 145) had an average
bias of +.21 (range = –3.13–5.09, SD = 1.63). A one-way ANOVA was used to test for
differences in initial-letter biases between the three threat conditions and was
nonsignificant, F(2, 401) = .21, p = .81, !2 = .001.
Interaction of Threat Condition " Explicit Self-Esteem
This next analysis was based on data from respondents who completed one of the
threat condition writing tasks, those with complete data on the RSES, and participants
who had complete ratings for the entire set of twenty Cartoon 1 captions (N = 396). The
average initial-letter bias for captions submitted by writers who shared participants’ first
initial was +.22 for this analysis (range = –3.46–5.09, SD = 1.58) and the average RSES
score was 20.71 (range = 5–30, SD = 4.97).
To examine whether the regression of Cartoon 1 initial-letter biases on threat
condition varied as a function of participants’ explicit self-esteem scores, the researcher
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again used Aiken & West’s (1991) multiple regression methods. First, each
respondent’s RSES score was centered by subtracting the sample mean from each score,
which was 20.71 (range = 5–30, SD = 4.97) for this sample. Next, threat condition was
dummy-coded with the control group serving as the comparison group. A regression
analysis was performed to test the b1 coefficient, which compared the mean initial-letter
biases for the control and self-concept threat conditions, and the b2 coefficient, which
compared the mean biases for the control and self-concept affirmation conditions.
Previously, threat condition did not predict differences in NLT biases. In the current
analysis, threat condition also did not predict biases toward captions submitted by writers
who shared participants’ first initial, with results similar in findings and logic to the oneway ANOVA reported above, i.e., threat condition did not predict Cartoon 1 initial-letter
biases, R2 = .002, F(2, 393) = .41, p = .66.
Next, the effect of explicit self-esteem as measured by centered RSES scores was
added to the multiple regression equation. Again, RSES scores did not help predict
initial-letter biases for Cartoon 1 when this variable was added to the model, R2change =
.007, F(1, 392) = 2.97, p = .09. Finally, the interactions of RSES scores and the two
threat condition comparisons were added to the model to determine whether biases, when
regressed on threat condition, varied as a function of participants’ explicit self-esteem.
The overall model including the dummy variables (threat conditions), continuous variable
(centered RSES scores), and their interactions was not significant, R2 = .010, F(5, 390) =
.79, p = .56. Joint tests of the b4 and b5 coefficients (corresponding to the interaction of
the self-concept threat vs. control condition ! RSES scores, and the interaction of the
self-concept affirmation vs. control condition ! RSES scores, respectively), did not
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significantly improve the multiple regression model, R

66
change

= .000, F(2, 390) = .09,

p = .92. Because there was no presence of interactions between threat conditions and
RSES scores, a simple slopes test to examine the nature of an interaction was not
performed. In sum, when initial-letter biases for Cartoon 1 were regressed onto threat
condition, biases did not vary as a function of participants’ explicit self-esteem. Please
refer to Table 7 for the progression of equations regressing initial-letter biases for
Cartoon 1 on threat condition as a function of explicit self-esteem.
Cartoon 2 Initial-Letter Biases
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions
Respondents who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat
condition to which they were randomly assigned and those with complete ratings for the
entire set of Cartoon 2 captions were included in these first analyses (N = 408). The
average initial-letter bias for these participants was +.10 (range = –3.81–4.47, SD = 1.47).
Participants in the self-concept threat condition (N = 126) demonstrated an
average bias of +.11 (range = –3.68–3.48, SD = 1.41). Those assigned to the self-concept
affirmation condition (N = 141) also had an average bias of +.11 (range = –2.62–3.42,
SD = 1.35), while participants assigned to the control condition (N = 141) exhibited an
average bias of +.08 (range = –3.81–4.47, SD = 1.65). A one-way ANOVA was used to
test for differences in initial-letter biases between the three threat conditions and was
nonsignificant, F(2, 405) = .02, p = .98, !2 = .00009.
Interaction of Threat Condition " Explicit Self-Esteem
This next analysis was based on data from respondents who completed a threat
condition writing task, those who had complete ratings for the entire set of twenty
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Cartoon 2 captions, and those with complete data on the RSES (N = 401). The average
bias exhibited toward Cartoon 2 captions submitted by writers who shared participants’
first initial was +.11 for this sample (range = –3.81–4.47, SD = 1.47). The average score
on the RSES was 20.72 (range 5–30, SD = 5.03), which was used to center participants’
explicit self-esteem scores prior to multiple regression analyses.

68
Aiken & West’s (1991) multiple regression methods were again used to
examine whether the regression of Cartoon 2 initial-letter biases on threat condition
varied as a function of participants’ explicit self-esteem. The same dummy codes for the
three threat conditions in the prior two analyses were again used in this analysis.
Previously, threat condition did not predict differences in NLT initial-letter biases or
differences in biases toward Cartoon 1 captions submitted by same-initial writers. In the
current analysis, threat condition also did not predict biases toward Cartoon 2 captions
submitted by writers with whom respondents shared a first initial, R2 = .000, F(2, 398) =
.05, p = .95. This analysis was similar in logic and result to the ANOVA reported above.
The effect of explicit self-esteem as measured by centered RSES scores was also
nonsignificant when added to the regression model, R2change = .003, F(1, 397) = 1.08, p =
.30. The overall model including the dummy variables (threat conditions), continuous
variable (centered RSES scores), and their interactions was nonsignificant, R2 = .006,
F(5, 395) = .48, p = .79. Adding the interaction terms did not significantly improve the
model, R2change = .003, F(2, 395) = .61, p = .54. In sum, when Cartoon 2 biases were
regressed on threat condition, biases did not vary as a function of participants’ explicit
self-esteem. For the progression of multiple regression equations, please refer to Table 8.
Average Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 Initial-Letter Biases
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions
Participants who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat
condition to which they were randomly assigned and those with complete ratings for the
entire set of Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 captions were included in these first analyses (N =
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373). The average initial-letter bias for these participants was +.16 (range = –2.19–
3.07, SD = 1.07).

!!
!
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Respondents in the self-concept threat condition (N = 117) demonstrated an
average bias of +.18 (range = –2.12–2.39, SD = 1.02). Those assigned to the self-concept
affirmation condition (N = 123) had an average bias of +.16 (range = –2.19–3.02, SD =
1.06), while participants assigned to the control condition (N = 133) exhibited an average
bias of +.14 (range = –2.13–3.07, SD = 1.14). A one-way ANOVA was used to test for
differences in initial-letter biases between the three threat conditions and was
nonsignificant, F(2, 370) = .05, p = .96, !2 = .0002.
Interaction of Threat Condition " Explicit Self-Esteem
Next, initial-letter biases for Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 were averaged together and
regressed onto threat condition to determine whether biases varied as a function of
participants’ explicit self-esteem. Aiken & West’s (1991) multiple regression methods
were again used and results are based on data from respondents who completed a threat
condition writing task, those who had complete ratings for Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2
captions, and those with complete data on the RSES (N = 367). The average bias
exhibited toward Cartoon 1 and 2 captions submitted by writers who shared participants’
first initial was +.17 for this sample (range = –2.19–3.07, SD = 1.07). The average score
on the RSES was 20.78 (range 5–30, SD = 5.00) and was used to center participants’
explicit self-esteem scores prior to multiple regression analyses.
The same dummy codes from the prior multiple regression analyses were used in
the current one. Previously, threat condition did not predict differences in NLT initialletter biases, or—individually—biases toward Cartoon 1 or 2 captions submitted by
same-initial writers. In the current analysis, threat condition also failed to predict average

71
biases demonstrated toward Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 captions submitted by writers
with whom participants shared a first initial, R2 = .001, F(2, 364) = .12, p = .89.
RSES scores also did not significantly predict average Cartoon 1 Cartoon 2
initial-letter biases when this variable was added to the model, R2change = .008, F(1, 363) =
2.97, p = .09. The overall model including the dummy variables (threat conditions),
continuous variable (centered RSES scores), and their interactions was nonsignificant, R2
= .012, F(5, 361) = .85, p = .52. Joint tests of the interaction terms were nonsignificant as
well, R2change = .003, F(2, 361) = .52, p = .60, but the test of the b3 coefficient for the
contribution of RSES scores to the final multiple regression model approached
significance, t(361) = 1.84, p = .07. For the progression of multiple regression equations
regressing initial-letter biases for both Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 on threat condition as a
function of participants’ explicit self-esteem, please refer to Table 9.
The Name Letter Test (Nicknames)
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions
Respondents who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat
condition to which they were randomly assigned, those with complete ratings on the
NLT, and those who indicated an alternate initial for the name they “went by” that was
different from that of their first given name were included in these first analyses (N = 53).
The average nickname initial-letter bias demonstrated by these participants was +.28
(range = –3.61–3.72, SD = 1.79).
Participants in the self-concept threat condition (N = 16) demonstrated an average
bias of –.16 (range = –2.54–2.99, SD = 1.75). Those assigned to the self-concept
affirmation condition (N = 20) had an average bias of +.08 (range = –3.61–2.71, SD =
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1.87), while respondents assigned to the control condition (N = 17) exhibited an
average bias of +.93 (range = –2.37–3.72, SD = 1.63). A one-way ANOVA was used to
test for differences in initial-letter biases between the three threat conditions and was
nonsignificant, F(2, 50) = 1.79, p = .18, !2 = .07.
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Interaction of Threat Condition ! Explicit Self-Esteem
For this analysis, initial-letter biases were based on participants’ biases toward
their nickname initial. Data were included from respondents who a) indicated they “went
by” a name other than their first given name such as a “nickname,” b) indicated their
nickname initial, c) completed a threat condition writing task, d) had complete data on the
NLT, and e) had complete data on the RSES (N = 52). The average initial-letter bias for
participants in this sample on the NLT was +.24 (range = –3.61–3.72, SD = 1.78). The
sample mean for RSES scores was 20.15 (range 7–29, SD = 4.91) and was used to center
participants’ RSES scores prior to multiple regression analyses (Aiken & West, 1991).
Previously, threat condition did not predict differences in initial-letter biases on
the NLT or differences in biases toward same-initial writers’ captions for Cartoon 1 or
Cartoon 2 (individually or when averaged together). In the current analysis, threat
condition also did not predict nickname initial biases on the NLT, R2 = .054, F(2, 49) =
1.40, p = .26. Centered RSES scores also did not significantly predict biases toward
nickname initials when this variable was added to the model, R2change = .000, F(1, 48) =
.01, p = .94. The overall model including threat conditions, centered RSES scores, and
their interactions was nonsignificant, R2 = .148, F(5, 46) = 1.60, p = .18. The interaction
terms did not together significantly improve the multiple regression model, although they
approached significance, R2change = .094, F(2, 46) = 2.53, p = .09. In sum, when biases
demonstrated toward nickname initial letters on the NLT were regressed on threat
condition, biases did not vary as a function of participants’ explicit self-esteem. For the
progression of multiple regression equations, please refer to Table 10.
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Cartoon 1 Initial-Letter Biases (Nicknames)
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions
Respondents who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat
condition to which they were randomly assigned, those with complete caption ratings on
Cartoon 1, and those who indicated an alternate initial for the name they “went by” that
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was different from that of their first given name were included in these first analyses
(N = 45). The average nickname initial-letter bias demonstrated by these participants was
–.28 (range = –3.78–3.80, SD = 1.88).
Participants in the self-concept threat condition (N = 15) demonstrated an average
bias of +.19 (range = –3.13–3.80, SD = 1.94). Those assigned to the self-concept
affirmation condition (N = 16) had an average bias of –.52 (range = –3.28–3.21, SD =
1.87), while participants assigned to the control condition (N = 14) exhibited an average
bias of –.50 (range = –3.78–3.79, SD = 1.86). A one-way ANOVA was used to test for
differences in biases between the three threat conditions and was nonsignificant, F(2, 42)
= .69, p = .51, !2 = .03160779.
Interaction of Threat Condition " Explicit Self-Esteem
This analysis was based on data from respondents who: a) indicated they “went
by” a name other than their first given name such as a “nickname,” b) indicated their
nickname initial, c) completed a threat condition writing task, d) completed all ratings for
Cartoon 1, and e) had complete data on the RSES (N = 44). The average nickname initial
bias for participants in this sample was –.37 (range = –3.78–3.80, SD = 1.79). The
average score on the RSES was 20.45 (range 8–30, SD = 4.60) for this sample and was
used to center explicit self-esteem scores prior to multiple regression analyses (Aiken &
West, 1991).
Previously, threat condition did not predict differences in NLT initial-letter biases
(for nickname initials or first given name initials) or differences in initial-letter biases on
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Cartoon 1 or Cartoon 2 (individually or when averaged together). In the current
analysis, threat condition also did not predict Cartoon 1 biases toward nickname initials,
R2 = .057, F(2, 41) = 1.23, p = .30. RSES scores also did not significantly predict biases
toward nickname initials when this variable was added to the model, R2change = .001, F(1,
40) = .03, p = .86. The addition of the interaction terms also failed to improve the
multiple regression model, R2change = .035, F(2, 38) = .73, p = .49, and the overall model
including threat conditions, centered RSES scores, and their interactions was
nonsignificant, R2 = .092, F(5, 38) = .77, p = .58. For the progression of equations
regressing Cartoon 1 nickname initial biases on threat condition as a function of explicit
self-esteem, please refer to Table 11.
Cartoon 2 Initial-Letter Biases (Nicknames)
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions
Respondents who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat
condition to which they were randomly assigned, those with complete caption ratings on
Cartoon 2, and those who indicated an alternate initial for the name they “went by” that
was different from that of their first given name were included in these first analyses (N =
43). The average nickname initial-letter bias demonstrated by these participants was –.19
(range = –3.58–3.02, SD = 1.24).
Participants in the self-concept threat condition (N = 13) demonstrated an average
bias of +.03 (range = –2.06–1.93, SD = 1.10). Those assigned to the self-concept
affirmation condition (N = 18) had an average bias of –.29 (range = –3.58–2.01, SD =
1.35), while participants assigned to the control condition (N = 12) also exhibited an
average bias of –.29 (range = –1.98–3.02, SD = 1.30). A one-way ANOVA was used to
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test for differences in initial-letter biases between the three threat conditions and was
nonsignificant, F(2, 40) = .28, p = .76, !2 = .013745.
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Interaction of Threat Condition ! Explicit Self-Esteem
For this set of analyses, initial-letter biases were based on respondents’
preferences for their nickname initial. Participants were included in the analyses if a) they
indicated they “went by” a name other than their first given name such as a “nickname,”
b) they reported their nickname initial, c) completed a threat condition writing task, d)
rated all twenty captions for Cartoon 2, and e) had complete data on the RSES (N = 43).
The mean nickname initial bias was the same average reported for the above sample: –.19
(range = –3.58–3.02, SD = 1.24). The average score on the RSES was 20.84 for the
present sample (range 8–30, SD = 4.43), which was used to center participants’ explicit
self-esteem scores prior to multiple regression analyses (Aiken & West, 1991).
Biases toward captions submitted by writers who shared participants’ first
nickname initial were regressed on threat condition as a function of explicit self-esteem.
Thus far, threat condition failed to predict initial-letter biases in all analyses, and in the
current analysis, threat condition also did not predict Cartoon 2 nickname initial biases,
R2 = .014, F(2, 40) = .28, p = .76. RSES scores also did not significantly predict biases
when this variable was added to the model, R2change = .015, F(1, 39) = .62, p = .44.
Addition of the interactions between threat conditions and RSES scores did not
significantly improve the multiple regression model, R2change = .068, F(2, 37) = 1.38, p =
.26, and the overall model including threat conditions, centered RSES scores, and their
interactions was nonsignificant, R2 = .097, F(5, 37) = .79, p = .56. For the progression of
multiple regression equations regressing Cartoon 2 nickname initial biases on threat
condition as a function of explicit self-esteem, please refer to Table 12.

79

Average Cartoon 1 and 2 Initial-Letter Biases
Differences in Biases Across Threat Conditions
Respondents who wrote at least three sentences relevant to the experimental threat
condition to which they were randomly assigned, those with complete caption ratings on
both Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2, and those who indicated an alternate initial for the name
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they “went by” that was different from that of their first given name were included in
these first analyses (N = 39). The average nickname initial bias demonstrated by these
participants was –.32 (range = –3.30–1.98, SD = 1.08).
Participants in the self-concept threat condition (N = 13) exhibited an average bias
of –.05 (range = –1.28–1.68, SD = 1.06). Those assigned to the self-concept affirmation
condition (N = 15) had an average bias of –.52 (range = –3.30–1.98, SD = 1.31), while
respondents assigned to the control condition (N = 11) demonstrated an average bias of
–.37 (range = –1.39–1.20, SD = .73). A one-way ANOVA was used to test for differences
in biases between the three threat conditions and was nonsignificant, F(2, 36) = .67, p =
.52, !2 = .03572313.
Interaction of Threat Condition " Explicit Self-Esteem
This analysis was based on average Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 biases exhibited
toward nickname initials. Data were included from respondents who a) indicated they
“went by” a name other than their first given name such as a “nickname,” b) reported
their nickname initial, c) completed a threat condition writing task, d) rated all captions
for both Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2, and e) had complete data on the RSES (N = 39). The
mean nickname initial bias demonstrated by participants in this sample was the same
average reported above: –.32 (range = –3.30–1.98, SD = 1.08). The average score on the
RSES was 20.87 (range 8–30, SD = 4.43) and was used to center participants’ scores
prior to multiple regression analyses (Aiken & West, 1991).
Biases toward captions submitted by writers who shared respondents’ nickname
initial were regressed on threat condition as a function of explicit self-esteem. Previously,
threat condition did not predict differences in NLT initial-letter biases (based on
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participants’ initial for their first given name or their nickname initial) or differences in
biases on Cartoon 1 or Cartoon 2 individually (for initials of first given names or
nicknames). In the current analysis, threat condition also did not predict average Cartoon
1 and Cartoon 2 biases toward captions written by same nickname initial writers, R2 =
.036, F(2, 36) = .67, p = .52. RSES scores also did not significantly predict biases when
this variable was added to the model, R2change = .008, F(1, 35) = .30, p = .59. The
interactions of threat condition and RSES scores also failed to significantly improve the
multiple regression model, R2change = .095, F(2, 33) = 1.82, p = .18. The overall model
including threat conditions, centered RSES scores, and their interactions was
nonsignificant, R2 = .139, F(5, 33) = 1.06, p = .40. For the progression of equations
regressing average Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 nickname initial biases on threat condition as
a function of explicit self-esteem, please refer to Table 13.
In sum, despite previous studies which have found initial-letter biases to diverge
among those with low and high explicit self-esteem after experiencing a self-concept
threat (Jones et al., 2002), the current investigation did not find evidence of such an
interaction on any of the initial-letter preference tasks. Name-letter preferences’ function
of self-esteem regulation was not supported, even for those participants with high explicit
self-esteem.
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CHAPTER 7
SELF-ATTITUDE ACCESSIBILITY AND INITIAL-LETTER BIASES
Participants were randomly assigned to surveys containing one of two
administration orders of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1989):
before vs. after the initial-letter preference tasks. The purpose of this scale was to
examine respondents’ conscious self-worth (“explicit self-esteem”) and its relation to
initial-letter biases, as discussed in the previous chapter. Administration order of this
explicit measure was manipulated to compare differences in biases between participants
whose self-attitudes were accessible with biases of those who completed the RSES after
the implicit tasks, corresponding to the “high” and “low” self-attitude accessibility
conditions, respectively. Based on previous research, respondents whose self-attitudes
had been primed prior to the Name Letter Test (NLT) and cartoon caption rating task
were expected to exhibit stronger initial-letter biases than their low self-attitude
accessibility counterparts (Krizan & Suls, 2008).
The Name Letter Test
Of the 420 participants with complete and non-redundant data on the NLT, 410 of
these respondents also had complete data on the RSES. The average NLT initial-letter
bias demonstrated by this group of participants was +1.36 (range = –3.43–6.05, SD =
1.62). Participants assigned to the “high self-attitude accessibility” condition (N = 214)
on average exhibited a +1.43 initial-letter bias (range = –2.83–5.64, SD = 1.62), while
those assigned to the “low self-attitude accessibility” condition (N = 196) on average
83
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demonstrated a +1.29 bias toward their first given name initial (range = –3.43–6.05,
SD = 1.63). While in the predicted direction, high self-attitude accessibility participants
did not exhibit significantly stronger initial-letter biases on the NLT than their low selfattitude accessibility counterparts, t(408) = .89, p = .38 (two-tailed), d = .09.
Cartoon 1 Initial-Letter Biases
Of the 428 respondents with complete and non-redundant ratings for Cartoon 1
captions, 419 of these participants also had complete data on the RSES. The average
initial-letter bias exhibited by this group of participants was +.20 (range = –3.46–5.09,
SD = 1.58). High self-attitude accessibility respondents (N = 220) on average
demonstrated a +.17 bias on Cartoon 1 (range = –3.46–4.30, SD = 1.61), while low selfattitude accessibility participants (N = 199) on average exhibited a +.24 bias toward the
caption written by the writer who shared their first given name initial (range = –3.45–
5.09, SD = 1.56). Differences in initial-letter biases between participants with high and
low self-attitude accessibility were not in the predicted direction and were not statistically
significant, t(417) = –.47, p = .64 (two-tailed), d = –.04.
Cartoon 2 Initial-Letter Biases
Of the 429 respondents with complete and non-redundant ratings for Cartoon 2
captions, 421 of these participants also had complete data on the RSES. The average
initial-letter bias demonstrated by this group of participants was +.10 (range = –3.81–
4.47, SD = 1.47). High self-attitude accessibility participants (N = 213) on average
exhibited a +.26 initial-letter bias (range = –3.14–4.47, SD = 1.47), while low selfattitude accessibility respondents (N = 208) demonstrated an average negative bias of
–.05 toward the caption written by the writer who shared their first given name initial
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(range = –3.81–3.48, SD = 1.46). Differences in biases between participants with high
and low self-attitude accessibility were in the predicted direction and were statistically
significant, t(419) = 2.16, p = .03 (two-tailed), d = .21.
Average Cartoon 1 and 2 Initial-Letter Biases
Of the 394 respondents with complete and non-redundant ratings for both Cartoon
1 and Cartoon 2 captions, 387 of these participants also had complete data on the RSES.
The average bias exhibited by this group of participants was +.16 (range = –2.46–3.12,
SD = 1.08). High self-attitude accessibility participants (N = 200) on average
demonstrated a +.23 initial-letter bias across both sets of cartoon captions (range = –
2.46–3.07, SD = 1.12), while low self-attitude accessibility respondents (N = 187)
exhibited an average bias of +.08 toward captions written by writers who shared their
first given name initial (range = –2.19–3.12, SD = 1.03). Differences in biases between
participants with high and low self-attitude accessibility were in the direction predicted,
but were not statistically significant, t(385) = 1.33, p = .19 (two-tailed), d = .14.
Overall, biases demonstrated on the initial-letter preference tasks did not
significantly differ between respondents who completed the explicit measure prior to vs.
after the implicit tasks, except on Cartoon 2. For average initial-letter biases exhibited by
low and high self-attitude accessibility participants on all initial-letter preference tasks
(including biases demonstrated toward nickname initials), please refer to Table 14.
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CHAPTER 8
GENDER DIFFERENCES AND GENDER BIASES
Based on previous research investigating gender differences in name-letter
preferences (Kityama & Karasawa, 1997; Pelham, Mirenberg, & Jones, 2002), women
were expected to demonstrate stronger initial-letter biases than men. Ostensibly, women
have a stronger affinity toward their first names because these names will remain with
them throughout their lifetime. This study was also the first to examine whether gender
biases serve to strengthen the name letter effect. First, differences in initial-letter biases
between men and women were examined.
Gender Differences
The Name Letter Test
As predicted, initial-letter biases on the Name Letter Test (NLT) were
significantly stronger for women than for men, t(418) = 2.51, p = .01 (two-tailed), d =
.25. On average, women exhibited a +1.52 bias toward their initial letter (range = –2.83–
6.05, SD = 1.63; N = 270), while men demonstrated a +1.11 bias toward their initial
(range = –3.43–4.97, SD = 1.61; N = 150). Individually, women’s and men’s initial-letter
biases on the NLT were both significantly different from zero, t(269) = 15.38, p < .001, d
= 1.14 (women), and t(149) = 8.44, p < .001, d = .69 (men).
When biases toward nickname initials were examined, men unexpectedly
demonstrated stronger biases than did women. Men’s average biases (M = +.64,
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range = –3.61–4.97, SD = 1.61; N = 25) and women’s average biases (M = +.14, range
= –2.70–3.72, SD = 1.86; N = 33) differed by half of a scale point, however, this
difference was not statistically significant, t(56) = –1.08, p = .29 (two-tailed), d = .29.
Individually, men’s nickname initial biases were marginally significantly different from
zero (with 0 = no bias), t(24) = 2.00, p < .06 (two-tailed), d = .40; but women’s nickname
initial biases were not, t(32) = .43, p = .67, (two-tailed) d = .08. This finding is interesting
because women, as expected, demonstrated stronger initial-letter biases on the NLT than
men when the initial for their first given name was used in analyses, but men exhibited
stronger biases than women when it came to evaluations of their nickname initial.
Cartoon 1 Initial-Letter Biases
Average biases exhibited toward captions written by same-initial writers were
identical between women (M = +.18, range = –3.46–5.09, SD = 1.64; N = 282) and men
(M = +.18, range = –.75–3.94, SD = 1.48; N = 146). Individually, women’s initial-letter
biases were marginally significant, t(281) = 1.86, p = .06 (two-tailed), d = .11, but men’s
biases were not, t(145) = 1.44, p = .15 (two-tailed), d = .12.
Men did not demonstrate a significant bias toward captions submitted by samenickname initial writers for Cartoon 1 (M = +.002, range = –3.02–3.80, SD = 1.95; N =
20), t(19) = .01, p = .996 (two-tailed), d = .001. An unexpected finding, however,
emerged for women. Not only did they not prefer captions written by writers who shared
their nickname initial, they rated them as significantly less humorous than captions
submitted by writers who did not share their nickname initial (M = –.63, range = –3.78–
3.21, SD = 1.69; N = 31), t(30) = –2.09, p < .05 (two-tailed), d = –.37. Whereas men were
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essentially unbiased toward captions written by same-nickname initial writers, women
were unexpectedly biased against these writers’ captions, and significantly so.
Cartoon 2 Initial-Letter Biases
This time, men demonstrated stronger biases (M = +.14, range = –3.81–3.44, SD =
1.47; N = 143) than did women (M = +.07, range = –3.25– 4.47, SD = 1.49; N = 286)
toward captions submitted by same-initial writers, however this gender difference was
not statistically significant, t(427) = –.428, p = .67 (two-tailed), d = .05. Neither men’s
nor women’s individual biases were significantly different from zero, t(142) = 1.14, p =
.26, two-tailed (men), d = .10, and t(285) = .85, p = .40, two-tailed (women), d = .05.
In nickname initial analyses, neither women nor men demonstrated biases toward
captions submitted by writers who shared their nickname initial. Women, on average,
exhibited a –.10 bias (range = –2.06–3.02, SD = 1.33; N = 32), rating captions by sameinitial writers slightly lower than captions written by different-initial writers. Men, on
average, demonstrated a slightly less negative bias of –.04 (range = –3.58–2.01, SD =
1.26; N = 17). Women’s and men’s difference in biases was not significant, t(47) = –.16,
p = .88 (two-tailed), d = .05.
Average Cartoon 1 and 2 Initial-Letter Biases
When initial-letter biases for Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 were averaged together,
women and men both exhibited a slight bias toward captions submitted by same-initial
writers. On average, women rated both captions written by same-initial writers +.14
points higher (range = –2.46–3.07, SD = 1.08; N = 263) relative to their ratings of noninitial writers’ captions and as compared to normative ipsatized baseline ratings. This
bias toward initial-letter writers’ captions was significantly different from zero, t(262) =

90
2.05, p = .04, d = .13. Men rated captions written by same-initial writers on average
+.16 points higher (range = –2.01–3.12, SD = 1.09; N = 131) than non-initial writers’
captions and as compared to normative baselines. Men’s average initial-letter biases,
however, only approached significance, t(130) = 1.72, p = .09, d = .15. Taken together,
both women and men demonstrated small biases toward both captions written by sameinitial writers, and women’s and men’s biases did not significantly differ from each other,
t(392) = –.23, p = .82 (two-tailed), d = .02.
Finally, in nickname analyses, neither women nor men exhibited biases toward
their nickname initial letter. On the contrary, women on average exhibited a –.29 negative
bias toward captions written by writers who shared their nickname initial (range = –2.52–
1.98, SD = .98; N = 29), while men exhibited a slightly stronger negative bias of –.34
toward nickname-initial writers’ captions (range = –3.30–1.68, SD = 1.16; N = 16). While
both women and men unexpectedly exhibited negative nickname initial biases, neither of
these biases were individually significantly different from zero, t(28) = –1.57, p = .13
(two-tailed), d = –.30 (women), and t(15) = –1.17, p = .26, (two-tailed), d = –.29 (men).
Gender differences in biases were also not statistically significant, t(43) = .27, p = .87
(two-tailed), d = .05.
Same-Gender Biases
Next, biases toward captions submitted by writers who were the same gender as
participants were measured by computing a “same-gender preference score,” or “samegender bias.” The self-corrected algorithm (S-algorithm; LeBel & Gawronski, 2009) was
used instead of the ipsatized algorithm because computation of normative baseline ratings
for captions would not be a neutral comparison metric because these baselines would be
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comprised of caption ratings made by participants of the opposite gender. Instead, the
average rating men assigned to captions submitted by women writers (“opposite gender”)
was subtracted from the average rating men assigned to captions submitted by men
writers (“same gender”) to obtain their “same-gender bias” at the individual level. This
procedure was repeated for women writers, with the average rating assigned to captions
written by men subtracted from the average rating women assigned to captions written by
other women.
Cartoon 1
The average same-gender bias for men respondents with complete caption ratings
on Cartoon 1 was +.22 (range = –1.20–2.20, SD = .65; N = 146). Men’s self-corrected
increases in liking for captions written by men relative to ratings of captions written by
women were significantly different from zero, t(145) = 4.14, p < .001, d = .34.
Examination of women participants’ same-gender biases presented a different, opposite
picture. Average biases ranged between –2.40 and 1.80, with a Mean of –.28 (SD = .66; N
= 282), indicating a bias toward captions submitted by men writers. While unexpected
and not in the predicted direction, women respondents’ bias toward captions submitted by
men was highly significant, t(281) = –7.106, p < .001, d = –.42. The difference in samegender biases exhibited between men and women participants (N = 428) was also highly
significant, t(426) = 7.50, p < .001, d = .76.
Cartoon 2
These analyses were repeated for Cartoon 2 caption ratings and the opposite
pattern of results emerged. This time, men respondents who rated all captions for Cartoon
2 demonstrated a bias toward captions written by women (M = –.18, range = –2.20-1.00,
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SD = .53; N = 143). Although not in the predicted direction, this bias was significant,
t(142) = –4.07, p < .001, d = –.34. Women participants were biased toward captions
written by other women for Cartoon 2 (M = +.27, range = –1.70–2.60, SD = .63; N = 286)
and this same-gender bias was significant, t(285) = 7.33, p < .001, d = .43. The difference
in same-gender biases exhibited between men and women participants on Cartoon 2 was
significant, t(427) = –7.41, p < .001, d = .77.
Average of Cartoon 1 and 2
When same-gender biases for Cartoon 1 and 2 were averaged together, men were
unbiased toward captions submitted by men (M = +.02, range = –1.15–1.35, SD = .41; N
= 131), which was nonsignificant, t(130) = .50, p = .62, d = .05. Women were similarly
unbiased toward women-written captions for Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 when biases were
averaged together (M = +.004, range = –1.60–1.80, SD = .46; N = 263), t(262) = .15, p =
.88, d = .01. The difference in same-gender biases exhibited between men and women
participants (N = 394) was also nonsignificant, t(392) = .29, p = .77, d = .04.
Shared Gender and Initial-Letter Biases
To determine whether initial-letter biases were even stronger when participants
shared both the same first initial and the same gender as a caption writer, same-initial
caption writer ratings were next coded as “same gender” vs. “different gender” for each
respondent. For example, for a male participant with the initial letter “A,” his ipsatized
and baseline-corrected humor rating assigned to the caption written by “Andrew” would
be coded as “same gender” for Cartoon 1. His humor rating for the caption writer
“Amanda” on Cartoon 2 would be coded as “different gender.” Equal numbers of each
gender of caption writers (10 women’s names and 10 men’s names) for each of the 20
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included letters of the alphabet were assigned to captions in random order for Caption
1. The opposite caption writer gender was assigned to that initial letter for Cartoon 2,
thus, participants’ gender matched that of their same-initial writer for either Cartoon 1 or
Cartoon 2, but never both.
Cartoon 1
Using the above coding scheme for the 428 respondents with complete Cartoon 1
humor ratings, 205 participants' gender matched that of their same-initial caption writer
and 223 participants’ gender did not match that of their same-initial caption writer. On
average, respondents’ initial-letter biases were + .20 points higher when their initialmatching caption writer was also the same gender (M = +.29, SD = 1.61), compared to
initial-letter biases exhibited by their initial-matching only counterparts (M = +.09, SD =
1.56). This difference in biases was in the direction predicted, however, it was not
statistically significant, t(426) = 1.31, p = .19 (two-tailed), d = .13.
Cartoon 2
Out of 429 respondents with complete Cartoon 2 caption ratings, 217 participants’
gender also matched that of their initial-matching caption writer’s, while 212
participants’ gender did not match that of their initial-matching caption writer. Mean
initial-letter biases for initial- and gender-matching participants was +.13 (SD =1.52),
while mean name-letter preferences for initial-only matching respondents was +.06 (SD =
1.45). This difference, while again in the predicted direction, was not significant, t(427) =
–.49, p = .63, d = .05.
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Cartoon 1 Nicknames
This analysis was based on 51 respondents who reported a nickname initial and
had complete ratings for Cartoon 1. Participants whose gender also matched that of a
nickname initial-matching caption writer (N = 31) exhibited an average bias of –.27 (SD
= 1.74), while those who only shared a nickname initial with a caption writer (N = 20),
demonstrated an average bias of –.56 (SD = 1.94). Both biases were unexpectedly
negative, but gender-matching participants’ nickname-initial biases were less negative
than those for gender-mismatching participants. This difference, however, was not
statistically significant, t(49) = .57, p = .58, d = .16.
Cartoon 2 Nicknames
Of the 49 respondents who provided their nickname initial, 21 shared the same
gender as their nickname initial-matching caption writer. Their average initial-letter bias
was –.17 (SD = 1.48), compared to the average bias of –.01 (SD = 1.16) demonstrated by
the 28 participants who only shared a nickname initial with a caption writer. This
difference was not in the direction predicted and was also not statistically significant,
t(47) = .437, p = .66, d = –.12.

CHAPTER 9
IMPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM AND INITIAL-LETTER BIASES
Implicit self-esteem was assessed using Gebauer, Riketta, Broemer, and Maio’s
(2008) single-item measure of name-liking to examine its association with initial-letter
biases. Respondents rated how much they liked their full name from 1) not at all to 7)
very much as an implicit measure of their unconscious global self-value and self-worth.
The average name-liking rating was 5.59 (range = 1–7, SD = 1.30; N = 479). Men
demonstrated slightly higher implicit self-esteem than did women, rating their name on
average .13 points higher (M = 5.68, range = 2–7, SD = 1.25; N = 166) than women
participants (M = 5.55, SD = 1.33; N = 313). Men’s and women’s difference in implicit
self-esteem scores, however, was not statistically significant, t(477) = 1.07, p = .28 (twotailed), d = .10.
To examine the effect of implicit self-esteem on initial-letter biases, respondents’
name-liking scores were first standardized. Cut-off values for “low implicit self-esteem”
were equivalent to 1.00 or more standard deviations below the mean (set at zero), values
greater than –1.00 standard deviation, but less than +1.00 standard deviation were
categorized as “average implicit self-esteem,” and values 1.00 standard deviation or more
above the mean were considered to be suggestive of “high implicit self-esteem.” Of the
479 participants who completed the single-item measure, 89 (18.6%) had
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standardized scores indicative of “low implicit self-esteem,” 247 participants (51.6%)
had “average implicit self-esteem,” and 143 had “high implicit self-esteem” (29.9%).
The Name Letter Test
Scores on the Name Letter Test (NLT) were regressed on participants’ level of
implicit self-esteem. Level of implicit self-esteem (“low,” “average,” and “high”) was
dummy coded, with the “average implicit self-esteem” group serving as the comparison
group. As predicted, level of implicit self-esteem predicted initial-letter biases on the
NLT, but only accounted for 2% of the variance in biases, R2 = .02, F(2, 417) = 3.58, p =
.03. Also as predicted, the dummy-coded variable comparing the low implicit self-esteem
group to the average implicit self-esteem group was negatively associated with initialletter biases, however, it was not a significant predictor, t(417) = –.62, p = .54. The
dummy-coded variable comparing the high and average implicit self-esteem groups,
however, was a significant and positive predictor of initial-letter biases, t(417) = 2.28, p =
.02. A follow-up regression analysis comparing only the low implicit self-esteem group
to the high implicit self-esteem group was also significant, R2 = .03, F(1, 202) = 5.17, p =
.02.
When initial-letter biases exhibited on the NLT were regressed on level of
implicit self-esteem (“low,” “average,” and “high”) for participants with nicknames (N =
58), implicit self-esteem did not significantly predict biases, R2 = .04, F(2, 55) = 1.05, p
= .36.
Cartoon 1
Cartoon 1 initial-letter biases were also regressed on participants’ level of implicit
self-esteem (“low, “average,” and “high”). The same dummy codes were used from the
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above analysis, with the “average implicit self-esteem” group serving as the
comparison group. Level of implicit self-esteem did not predict biases toward captions
written by same-initial writers, R2 = .002, F(2, 425) = .46, p = .63. The dummy-coded
variable comparing the low implicit self-esteem group to the average implicit self-esteem
group was again negatively associated with initial-letter biases, however, it was not a
statistically significant predictor, t(425) = –.45, p = .66. The dummy-coded variable
comparing the high implicit self-esteem group to the average implicit self-esteem group
was positively associated with initial-letter biases, but this predictor also was not
statistically significant, t(425) = .67, p = .51. A follow-up regression analysis comparing
only the low implicit self-esteem group to the high implicit self-esteem group was nonsignificant as well, R2 = .004, F(1, 208) = .88, p = .35.
When Cartoon 1 initial-letter biases were regressed on level of implicit selfesteem for respondents with nicknames (N = 51), implicit self-esteem also did not
significantly predict biases, R2 = .01, F(2, 48) = .18, p = .83.
Cartoon 2
Level of implicit self-esteem did not predict biases toward Cartoon 2 captions
written by same-initial writers, R2 = .01, F(2, 426) = 1.16, p = .31. The dummy-coded
variable comparing the low implicit self-esteem group to the average implicit self-esteem
group was again negatively associated with biases, however, it was not a significant
individual predictor, t(426) = –1.42, p = .16. The dummy-coded variable comparing the
high implicit self-esteem group to the average implicit self-esteem group also was not
statistically significant, t(426) = .08, p = .93. A follow-up regression analysis comparing
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only the low implicit self-esteem group to the high implicit self-esteem group did not
reach statistical significance, R2 = .01, F(1, 204) = 1.96, p = .16.
When Cartoon 2 initial-letter biases were regressed on level of implicit selfesteem (“low,” “average,” and “high”) for respondents with nicknames (N = 49), implicit
self-esteem did not significantly predict biases, R2 = .04, F(2, 46) = .96, p = .39.
Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2
Level of implicit self-esteem did not predict biases toward captions written by
same-initial writers when initial-letter biases were averaged together for both cartoons,
R2 = .01, F(2, 391) = 1.45, p = .24. The dummy-coded variable comparing the low
implicit self-esteem group to the average implicit self-esteem group was again negatively
associated with biases, however, it did not reach statistical significance as an individual
predictor, t(391) = –1.43, p = .16. The dummy-coded variable comparing the high
implicit self-esteem group to the average implicit self-esteem group was positively
associated with biases, but this predictor was again nonsignificant, t(391) = .45, p = .66.
A follow-up regression analysis comparing only the low implicit self-esteem group to the
high implicit self-esteem group did not reach statistical significance, R2 = .01, F(1, 188)
= 2.73, p = .10.
When average Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 initial-letter biases were regressed on
level of implicit self-esteem for participants with nicknames (N = 45), implicit selfesteem was a marginally significant predictor of nickname-initial biases, R2 = .13, F(2,
42) = 3.01, p = .06. This time, the dummy-coded variable comparing the low implicit
self-esteem group to the average implicit self-esteem group was positive and significant,
t(42) = 2.41, p = .02. The variable comparing the high implicit self-esteem group to the
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average implicit self-esteem group was also positive, but it was not significant, t(42) =
.41, p = .69. Differences in initial-letter biases among participants with low, average, and
high implicit self-esteem are summarized in Table 15.

CHAPTER 10
DISCUSSION
The aims of the present investigation were to provide a novel test of the name
letter effect and to introduce two new variables that might influence initial-letter biases.
The current study opened “the black box” of the subjective experience of humor and
found preliminary empirical evidence that judgments of humor can fall prey to an
automatic, unconscious and objective bias in predictable ways: via implicit egotism.
Instead of being just another demonstration of the name letter effect, the relationship
between implicit self-esteem and name-letter preferences was also examined in order to
shed light on the current debate as to whether the Name Letter Test (NLT) measures
one’s underlying implicit global sense of self-worth or is best understood as a measure of
implicit egotism: the tendency to gravitate toward objects that share our self-attributes
such as our name letters.
Past theory on implicit egotism and research on the name letter effect suggests
that these biases are based on people’s implicit self-attitudes, which are overwhelmingly
positive in content. However, recent researchers have suggested that perhaps there is
another, overlooked side to the implicit egotism coin: name-letter biases might very well
be reversed for those who possess truly negative unconscious self-attitudes, i.e., “low
implicit self-esteem” (Pelham, Carvallo, & Jones, 2005). These authors recently raised
important questions for future research on the name-letter effect: are name-letter

100

101
preferences due to participants’ good fortune of possessing favorable implicit selfattitudes, or would biases be smaller or even reversed for those with low levels of implicit
self-esteem? Pelham et al. (2005) emphasized that answers to these questions would be
important to both social as well as clinical psychology. Thus, measurement of
participants’ level of implicit self-esteem and its influence on initial-letter biases was a
critical aim of the current study. If name-letter preferences are indeed representative of
one’s underlying self-attitudes, then participants with low implicit self-esteem should not
exhibit biases toward their name letters—perhaps even demonstrating a “reverse” name
letter effect. However, if name letter effects occurred regardless of respondents’ level of
implicit self-worth, then name-letter preferences as a measure of implicit egotism—as it
was originally designed—would be supported.
Biases toward persons of the same gender have been demonstrated in supervisorsupervisee relationships (Worthington & Stern, 1985) and therapist-patient treatment
outcomes (Zlotnick, Elkin, & Shea, 1998; Sterling, Gottheil, Weinstein, & Serota, 1998),
but had never before been examined within the field of implicit egotism. The current
investigation aimed to determine whether shared gender with fictitious caption writers
would further increase initial-letter biases, becoming the first implicit egotism experiment
to examine both types of biases in tandem.
By examining these two potential new influences on initial-letter biases, as well
as providing additional tests of previously identified variables’ impact on these biases,
the present study sought to increase the extant implicit egotism knowledge base by taking
another look at name-letter preferences. Biases toward nickname initials were also
measured, with results challenging the notion that virtually any self-related attribute can
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ignite implicit egotism. Finally, while many researchers have and continue to
administer the Name Letter Test (NLT) as a measure of implicit self-esteem, the current
study sought to examine the overlap between it and a newer measure of implicit selfesteem: Gebauer, Riketta, Broemer, & Maio’s (2008) single-item measure of nameliking.
General Initial-Letter Biases
As predicted, name letter effects were found on both the NLT and in judgments of
humor. Participants demonstrated a significant bias toward their first given name initial
on the Name Letter Test (NLT), increasing their ratings by +1.38 points relative to noninitials and group-averaged normative baselines on the 1) not at all beautiful to 7)
extremely beautiful scale. Also as predicted, respondents exhibited initial-letter biases in
their humor ratings for cartoon captions submitted by same-initial writers. The average
bias demonstrated across both sets of captions was +.15 points on the 1) not at all
humorous to 7) extremely humorous scale. While only a small initial letter effect was
found among ratings for captions submitted by same-initial writers, this finding suggests
that the otherwise subjective experience of humor operates at least partially outside of our
conscious awareness via one of our unconscious self-related biases—our implicit
preference for our name letters.
The present study offered a rare opportunity to examine biases toward initials of
names that participants indicated they “went by” and were different from the initial
indicated for their first given name, i.e., “nicknames.” The purpose of this distinction in
name-letter bias targets was two-fold. First, it allowed the researcher to confirm that
respondents indeed “went by” the initial they indicated for their first given name in order
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to establish the correct target name letter for analyses. Secondly, if they did not “go
by” their first given name, participants were asked to indicate the first letter for another
name such as a “nickname” if this was the name they routinely went by. In this way, the
current investigation became the first implicit egotism experiment to examine nickname
initial biases as distinct from first given name initial-letter biases.
As compared to nickname initials, the present study found that name-letter
preferences are relevant to first given name initials only—regardless of whether one goes
by their first given name or not. Nickname-initial biases on the NLT did not reach
statistical significance and an unexpected pattern of results emerged when it came to
biases demonstrated toward captions submitted by same-nickname initial writers.
Participants actually preferred captions submitted by writers with whom they did not
share a nickname initial, rating same-initial writers’ captions on average .30 points lower
across both cartoons. Curiously, this “reverse nickname-letter effect” was significant.
This is intriguing, especially when researchers such as Pelham, Mirenberg, and Jones
(2002) have argued virtually “anything that people associate with the self” can prompt
implicit egotism (p. 470). Moreover, authors such as Brendl, Chattopadhyay, Pelham, and
Carvallo (2005) later eliminated participants from their name-letter analyses if they went
by another name such as a nickname, because “the NL (name-letter) brand should have
been constructed from the nickname” (p. 409). Why biases against nickname initials
were found on the caption-rating tasks is counterintuitive and raises several empirical
questions. As the first implicit egotism study to examine nickname initial biases
specifically—and as distinct from first given name initial biases—a few possible
explanations are offered.
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First, perhaps name letter effects were too small to translate to nicknameinitial biases. Only a small initial letter effect was found in the humor judgments exercise,
thus it is possible that biases exhibited toward captions submitted by writers who shared
participants’ first given name initials were too small to translate to nickname initials.
However, biases observed on the NLT for first given name initials were very large, yet
they still did not translate into significant biases toward nickname initials on the NLT.
Nickname initial biases were decreased and sometimes even reversed. This begs
the question as to whether name-letter and nickname-letter preferences assess general
name-esteem, implicit egotism, or are a measure of implicit self-esteem. Perhaps
participants held negative attitudes toward their nicknames and/or nickname initials and
thus when confronted with nickname letter stimuli, their ratings reflected this negative
attitude toward this particular self-attribute. However, it seems odd for a person to “go
by” a name they do not particularly like. Implicit self-esteem for respondents who
indicated they went by their first given name and for those who went by a nickname was
nearly identical. However, this measure is based on participants’ liking for their entire
name (including their first and last name together) and it is unclear on which name
respondents based their ratings, i.e., their first given name and last name or their
nickname and last name. A name-liking measure which taps liking for participants’
nicknames specifically might or might not provide a window into these respondents’
implicit sense of self-worth, depending on how much of their identity is derived from
their unofficial name. But in the end, implicit self-esteem—as measured by full name
liking—only explained 1–2% of the variance in name-letter preferences anyway.
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Another potential explanation for decreased nickname initial letter biases is
that nicknames and nickname initials might not be as closely linked to one’s identity as
are first given names and their corresponding initials. Perhaps because a nickname is
presumably bestowed upon a person later in life after one’s identity is already
established, it is thus less “self-defining” despite being a name one regularly “goes by.”
Unfortunately, it is impossible to know at which point in a participant’s life a nickname
was assumed in the current study with respect to either age or stage of identity formation.
Previous studies that have ruled out the primacy effect as integral to name-letter biases
challenge this explanation of later-bestowed nicknames carrying less self-identity punch
and thereby mitigating implicit egotism. Namely, Hoorens and Todorova (1988) found
name-letter effects among Bulgarian students’ first and second languages with unique
alphabets. These authors argue that students do not typically begin their acquisition of a
second language with the mastery of name letters, and even if they did, it would be “less
thrilling” the second time around (Hoorens & Todorova, 1988). And representing perhaps
the strongest argument against nickname initials as not being self-defining enough are
Feys’ (1991; 1995) studies which were able to induce mere ownership in a laboratory
setting, including biases for newly-learned name-related symbols.
Finally, perhaps nicknames are more self-defining for men than women. While
men may be slower to mature, women—especially during the college years, which was
the demographic of the current study’s sample—might be more eager to eschew a
childhood nickname. While this explanation is speculative, men did exhibit a marginally
significant bias toward their nickname initial on the NLT and were nearly equivocal with
respect to the humor ratings they assigned to nickname-initial and non-nickname initial
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writers’ captions. Women, on the other hand, demonstrated statistically significant
negative biases toward their nickname initial on Cartoon 1. While only the negative
Cartoon 1 bias displayed by women reached significance, this otherwise consistent trend
in differences between men’s and women’s nickname initial letter biases is difficult to
ignore. Men’s vs. women’s self-attitudes toward their nicknames and how “self-defining”
they are for both genders await future research.
Whatever the reason nickname initial biases in the current study departed from
that of typical name letter effects, these results challenge previous researchers’ arguments
that virtually any self-attribute—provided one indeed associates this attribute with the
self—can predispose one to gravitate toward the object, person, or place that shares that
self-attribute. More research is needed on nickname letters’ link to one’s identity and
whether these stimuli offer the same opportunity for people to self-enhance when
confronted with these letters. Interestingly, when initial-letter biases for first given names
were re-examined without participants who indicated they went by a different (i.e.,
nickname) initial, results were nearly identical. Based on this, it is quite possible that
name-letter preferences are relevant to first given name initials only, even when a person
“goes by” another name beginning with a different letter. This lends support to the third
explanation, i.e., that nickname initials are not as closely linked to one’s identity as are
initials for first given names and thus do not provide the same opportunity to self-enhance
when confronted with only somewhat self-related stimuli.
Self-Attitude Accessibility
A recent meta-analysis by Krizan and Suls (2008) found self-attitude accessibility
increased initial-letter biases when explicit self-esteem measures were administered prior
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to an initial-letter preference task. While participants did exhibit somewhat stronger
biases when they completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1989)
prior to the NLT and caption-rating task in the current study, this effect was only
statistically significant for Cartoon 2. Why increasing respondents’ accessibility of their
self-attitudes did not replicate previous researchers’ findings across all implicit tasks—
especially the NLT—is curious because the same explicit measure (RSES) and implicit
measure (NLT) were used. It is possible that the RSES measure was not administered in
close enough proximity to the name-letter preference tasks to demonstrate an effect on
the NLT (which participants completed after the caption-rating task). However, based on
the average amount of time it took participants to complete the experiment—namely,
16.5 minutes on average—this is unlikely. Moreover, a self-attitude accessibility effect
was found for the second set of cartoon captions but not the first, which further discounts
attenuation due to increased temporal proximity and a diminished accessibility of selfattitudes. In addition, Cartoon 2’s overall name letter effect was nonsignificant and even
smaller than the name letter effect observed for Cartoon 1 (which was significant), yet a
self-attitude accessibility effect was still found for Cartoon 2 (but not Cartoon 1). In fact,
differences in biases between participants with high and low self-attitude accessibility
were in the opposite direction predicted for Cartoon 1. In sum, the current study’s mixed
results offer very little support—if any—for increased name-letter preferences when selfattitudes are more accessible.
Gender Differences
As predicted, women demonstrated significantly stronger first given name initialletter biases than men, but only on the NLT. And as discussed previously, men’s
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nickname biases were marginally significant on the NLT, while women’s were not.
Unexpectedly, when it came to nickname initials, both men and women exhibited either
no bias or a negative bias toward these letters on the caption-rating task, with women’s
negative nickname initial biases reaching significance for Cartoon 1. These lack of
biases—and sometimes even “reversed” biases—that participants demonstrated toward
nickname initials in their judgments of humor again raises questions as to whether
implicit egotism is theoretically relevant to nickname-related stimuli and/or if nicknames
are as strongly associated with the self for women as they are for men. At least for humor
judgments in the current study, it appears as though they are not.
Same-Gender Biases
A recent study using a similar variation of a cartoon caption contest found that
both men and women rated men’s captions as funnier than those created by women, and
both sexes misattributed humorous captions to having been written by men in a recall test
(Mickes, Walker, Parris, Mankoff, & Christenfeld, 2012). In the present study, men
exhibited a significant bias toward captions written by other men for Cartoon 1, however,
men significantly preferred captions written by women for Cartoon 2. The opposite
pattern of results emerged for women: they significantly preferred captions written by
other women for Cartoon 2, but significantly preferred captions written by men for
Cartoon 1. It is possible that more humorous captions were assigned to these genders for
these cartoons, however, the gender of caption writers was randomly assigned. Another
possible explanation is that a man was featured in the first cartoon, and consequently both
men and women participants unconsciously or consciously favored men writers’
perspectives on humorous caption content, while both men and women were featured in
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the second cartoon. This explanation is still tenuous, since a significant preference for
women-written captions emerged among both men’s and women’s ratings for Cartoon 2.
While in the direction predicted, shared gender with caption writers did not
significantly increase first given name initial-letter biases, but produced mixed results for
nickname initial biases. Same gender somewhat mitigated the observed negative bias
toward nickname initials observed for Cartoon 1, while increasing them for Cartoon 2. It
is not surprising that the self-relevant trait of gender failed to compound a name-letter
effect for nickname initials when results of the current study failed to support the notion
that nicknames are as closely linked to an individual’s identity as are first given names
(regardless of whether a person “goes by” that name or not) and are thus not as likely to
fall prey to implicit egotism. Although shared gender did somewhat “buffer” the negative
biases demonstrated toward nickname initials on the humor task, whether name-letter and
gender biases work stronger in tandem awaits additional research.
Implicit Self-Esteem
When NLT initial-letter biases were regressed on implicit self-esteem,
participant’s level of implicit self-esteem significantly predicted first given name initial
preferences, however, it only accounted for 2% of the variance in these biases. Level of
implicit self-esteem did not significantly predict initial-letter biases for Cartoon 1 or
Cartoon 2, accounting for only 1% of the variance in these name-letter preferences. With
implicit self-esteem predicting only 1–2% of the variance in the biases demonstrated on
both initial-letter preference tasks in the current study, it is questionable as to whether
name-letter preferences are indeed representative of and/or dependent upon one’s implicit
self-attitudes. Because a rather large name letter effect was exhibited on the NLT, one
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would expect more than one-third of the present investigation’s participants to have
the favorable implicit self-attitudes thought to drive these observed initial-letter biases.
Moreover, increasing the accessibility for what some researchers have argued are the
overwhelming positive self-attitudes responsible for name-letter preferences did not
consistently or significantly increase respondents’ initial-letter ratings, or their ratings for
captions submitted by same-initial writers. While implicit self-esteem may play some role
in name-letter biases—in the current study, its role was very small indeed—it cannot
fully account for our predisposition to gravitate toward self-related objects.
Self-Concept Threats
Casting further doubt on the role of self-esteem in name-letter preferences, a
threat to the self-concept did not increase biases—not even for those with high explicit
self-esteem. Previous researchers have found name-letter biases to diverge among those
with high vs. low explicit self-esteem after experiencing a temporary threat to the selfconcept. Again, tempering a threat to the self-concept is thought to be well-practiced
among those with high explicit self-esteem, suggesting classical conditioning
underpinnings of the name letter effect. To this end, researchers argue that name letters
and other self-related symbols are “fundamentally rewarding” and “the rough
psychological equivalent of meat powder to a hungry puppy” (Jones et al., 2004, p. 680).
Despite using these researchers’ method for delivering a self-concept threat and the same
name-letter preference measure, a threat to the self-concept was not a strong enough
motive for participants to self-enhance when confronted with their name letters,
regardless of their level of explicit self-esteem. Results of the present investigation do not
support name-letter preferences’ functional purpose of a self-regulation bias.
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Conclusion
What does the present study contribute to our understanding of implicit egotism
and name-letter preferences? It has demonstrated that implicit egotism is still a prevalent
social psychological phenomenon that exists not only among letter attractiveness ratings
on the NLT, but also in judgments of humor—albeit to a lesser degree. Additional
support for gender differences in NLT initial-letter biases was found, while findings for
the role self-attitude accessibility played across name-letter preference tasks were weak
and inconsistent. Previous findings of name-letter biases diverging among participants
with high and low explicit self-esteem in response to a self-concept threat were not
replicated. The impact of implicit self-esteem on initial-letter biases was examined, with
level of implicit self-esteem only accounting for less than a fraction of the variance in
name-letter preferences. Shared gender, when coupled with a shared initial with a caption
writer, increased biases toward these writers’ captions, but not significantly so. But
perhaps one of the most surprising and interesting findings was that significant name
letter effects were not found for nickname initials on the NLT or on the humor judgments
task.
Does the NLT simply measure implicit self-esteem? Buhrmester, Blanton, and
Swann (2011) argue that it does not. While the NLT is often used by researchers as an
index of implicit self-esteem, these authors suggest that using the NLT to assess implicit
self-attitudes is not recommended and that it is best understood as a measure of implicit
egotism. In their review, Buhrmester et al. (2011) cite studies where participants appeared
to have conscious access to unconscious feelings of self-worth (Gailliot & Schmeichel,
2006) and instances where approximately half of respondents recognized the self-
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referential nature of the NLT (Krizan, 2008). These and other examples have led
Buhrmester et al. (2011) to believe that instruments researchers have been using as
implicit measures of self-esteem (including the NLT) might not be immune to the selfpresentational biases inherent in explicit measures and “might be contaminated with
conscious content that is not of theoretic interest” (p. 371). Consequently, implicit
instruments such as the NLT may not be tapping the unconscious processes it purports to
measure. Finally, because implicit self-esteem measures—including the NLT—did not
predict general well-being and depression nowhere near as well as explicit measures did
in their meta-analysis, the authors are justifiably skeptical about the NLT’s ability to tap
self-esteem.
Implicit egotism researchers explain the name letter effect as a consequence of
people overwhelmingly possessing positive self-attitudes (Pelham, Carvallo, & Jones,
2005). Buhrmester et al. (2011) argue that such an explanation is questionable because
not everyone can have high implicit self-esteem. Results of the current study showed less
than one-third of participants had the high implicit self-esteem that—up until recently—
has been widely accepted as the mechanism driving name-letter preferences, challenging
the notion that people overwhelmingly possess favorable self-attitudes. To further
undercut such a rose-colored view of a population with “uniformly positive” implicit selfattitudes, Burhmester et al. (2011) argue that other researchers (Cassidy, 1988;
Sroufe,1989; Diener & Diener, 1995) have found that as much as one-third of children
possess insecure parent attachments, which have predicted incidence of low self-esteem
later in life. These insecure attachments styles are the very ones that authors such as
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DeHart, Pelham, and Tennen (2006) have found to be associated with low implicit
self-esteem in adulthood.
The improbability and lack of evidence in the current study that positive implicit
self-esteem is the norm, coupled with previous researchers’ correlations between implicit
and explicit measures increasing under cognitive load (Koole, Dijksterhuis, & van
Knippenberg, 2001) all suggest that the first available self-referential piece of
information is used in making implicit global self-assessments. Depleting participants’
cognitive resources compromises what Buhrmester et al. (2011) refer to as the “depth of
self-insight” necessary for making such an assessment and thus “removing the self from
self-relevant responding” (p. 376). These same researchers argue that the NLT in
particular also precludes “breadth of self-insight” because self-esteem is extremely multifaceted, yet the measure examines only a single aspect of participants’ self-regard—
namely, for their initials—in hopes that this one facet will translate to a much larger
global view of self-worth.
It is more probable that compromising cognitive resources triggers results in line
with implicit egotism because participants rely instead on automatic positivity biases
rather than an authentic implicit global view of self. Activation of a universal positivity
bias might explain the prevailing belief that people overwhelmingly possess favorable
self-attitudes, i.e., “positive implicit self-esteem.” Robust name-letter preferences need
not be dependent on/reflective of one’s level of implicit self-esteem. As to what the NLT
measures exactly, Buhrmester et al. (2011) again suggest that it is best understood as a
measure for which it was first designed, implicit egotism—the tendency to display
automatic positivity biases—instead of a measure of implicit self-attitudes.
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What were the correlations between the NLT, implicit self-esteem, and
explicit self-esteem? In the present study, level of implicit self-esteem significantly
predicted initial-letter biases on the NLT, but only accounted for 2% of the variance in
biases, R2 = .02, F(2, 417) = 3.58, N = 420, p = .03. And when implicit self-esteem was
treated as a continuous variable, the correlation between NLT biases and implicit selfesteem as measured by name-liking ratings became nonsignificant, r = .09, N = 420,
p = .06. NLT scores were unrelated to explicit self-esteem as measured by the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1989), r = .03, N = 410, p = .56, while implicit
self-esteem as measured by name-liking (Gebauer et al., 2008) was highly and
significantly correlated with explicit self-esteem (r = .26, N = 468, p < .001). Results of
the present study do not support name-letter preferences as dependent on or wholly
reflective of one’s self-esteem—either implicit or explicit.
A closer look at the semi-partial correlations between level of implicit self-esteem
and initial-letter biases while controlling for the effect of NLT scores on biases presents
somewhat discouraging information about the unique variance that Gebauer et al.’s
(2008) implicit self-esteem measure accounted for. Recall that level of implicit selfesteem was significantly but weakly correlated with NLT initial-letter biases and
significantly predicted biases on this name-letter preference task only. And while implicit
self-esteem level was associated with biases on the remaining tasks in the predicted
directions (biases were negatively associated with low implicit self-esteem and positively
associated with high implicit self-esteem), level of implicit self-esteem did not reach
significance as a predictor in any of the comparisons. Nevertheless, because implicit selfesteem level accounted for a significant (yet very modest) proportion of the variance in
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NLT biases, the relationship between implicit self-esteem and initial-letter biases on
the remaining name-letter preference tasks was examined while controlling for the effects
of NLT scores.
While the zero-order correlations were not statistically significant to begin with,
the semi-partial correlations decreased further once the effect of NLT biases were
residualized from biases exhibited on the cartoon caption rating task. For example, zeroorder correlations between low vs. high implicit self-esteem and cartoon caption biases
ranged from r = .07–.12 (all ps > .10). But when the effect of NLT biases was
residualized from caption biases, semi-partial correlations decreased to r = .03–.06, all of
which were also nonsignificant (all ps > .46). While the zero-order correlations were
originally also nonsignificant, it does appear that at least some—even as much as half—
of the variance in initial-letter biases exhibited on the cartoon caption rating tasks can be
accounted for by NLT biases.
Implicit self-esteem was significantly correlated with explicit self-esteem as
measured by name-liking and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES), respectively,
r = .26, p < .001. Explicit self-esteem was only weakly related to average biases exhibited
on the caption-rating tasks, r = .09, p = .07, and was unrelated to NLT biases, r = .03,
p = .56, even though previous research has found a weak, yet significant correlation of
r = .12 between the NLT and RSES (Krizan & Suls, 2008). Two diametrically opposed
inferences can be made for low correlations: either the implicit measure did not tap the
intended construct—thereby challenging the measure’s validity—or the two measures tap
two conceptually different constructs—supporting the measure’s discriminant validity
(LeBel & Gawronski, 2009).
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If the NLT does tap some aspect of self-esteem, then when compared to wellestablished measures of explicit self-esteem such as the RSES, this study’s results
support the NLT’s discriminant validity. However, such a conclusion is tenuous at best
because lack of support for convergent validity does not discriminant validity make.
Buhrmester et al. (2011) said it best when criticizing a crafty approach for enhancing
another implicit measure’s test-retest reliability estimates and the same notion applies
here: such an assumption would be “similar to elevating one’s estimate of a basketball
player’s shooting ability based on his poor dribbling skills” (p. 367).
On the other hand, high correlations—such as the one observed in the current
study between the implicit self-esteem name-liking measure and the explicit index of
self-esteem (RSES)—carry a different set of possible interpretations. Either the implicit
measure of self-esteem really did tap the intended construct of unconscious global selfworth—demonstrating its convergent validity with the explicit self-esteem measure—
or the implicit measure was contaminated with explicit processes (LeBel & Gawronski,
2009). However, because name-liking likely taps autobiographical information—at least
arguably more so than unconscious name-letter preferences—this gives support for the
implicit measure’s convergent validity with the RSES. Moreover, just as name-letter
biases did not significantly increase when the RSES was administered prior to the NLT,
name-liking also was not stronger among participants whose explicit self-attitudes had
been primed, i.e., made more accessible, prior to the implicit self-esteem (name-liking)
measure as compared to those who completed the name-liking measure first, t(466) =
–.55, p = .58. Therefore, the implicit self-esteem measure could not have been
contaminated by readily available explicit self-attitudes.
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Limitations of the Current Study
Web-Based Research
One limitation of the current investigation is the lack of control and consistency
over the experimental setting. Because the study was designed to be completed online,
participants were free to take part in the experiment from any campus or personal
computer that had a connection to the internet. An inherent pitfall of web-based research
is that respondents may have been distracted by any number of factors, which could have
potentially compromised their attention to the experiment. Because a researcher could not
be present during the administration of the experiment in this type of environment, it is
unknown whether such distractions may have prevented participants from providing their
undivided attention to the study. However, the implicit processes underlying name-letter
preferences are not dependent upon large amounts of cognitive resources and occur very
efficiently.
In a similar vein, the amount of time participants spent completing the experiment
could not be monitored and as a result, a small percentage of respondents had completion
times that exceeded the amount of credit they were compensated for their participation
(one hour). Unlike participants who might have spent too little time completing the
experiment, long completion times suggest that participants might have begun the
experiment and returned to it at a later time and/or did not rely on their “gut” feelings
when assigning relevant attractiveness or humor ratings to name-letter stimuli. Thus, a
conservative approach to these issues was to perform parallel analyses both with and
without data from respondents with unusually short or long completion times.
Fortunately, these concerns were unsubstantiated. Results were extremely similar, if not
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identical, when analyses both excluded or included data from participants with short
or long completion times. Moreover, the key dependent variables in the present study
required little more than a heuristic-based judgment based on a rapid “gut” feeling, thus
even under conditions of high cognitive load, an effect would still likely have been found.
Indeed, rather large effect sizes were found for initial-letter biases, at least on the NLT.
A Note on Randomization
Men and women participants were randomly assigned to complete 1 of 24
surveys. The surveys were identical in content (with the exception of three different
threat conditions) and consisted of two orders of explicit-implicit measures and four
orders of captions. Every effort was taken to make aspects of the experiment random,
however, all features were not possible to randomize using the technology of the webbased research tool. For example, while some researchers administer the NLT using one
fixed random display order of alphabet letters (LeBel & Campbell, 2009), others have
used several different random alphabet orders (Stieger & LeBel, 2012; Koole, et al, 2001;
Nuttin, 1987) or even individual random orders (Dijksterhuis, 2004).
Ideally, at least several random orders would have been used in the present study,
however, the number of surveys required to allow randomization of even the most
essential experiment features already resulted in 48 surveys, including 24 surveys for
men and 24 surveys for women. Manipulating alphabet order even at a minimum level
with two different display orders would have required nearly 100 unique surveys.
Because component parts of individual questions could not be randomized in the current
study without creating numerous additional versions of the survey, the researcher focused
on randomizing only the most critical experiment features, i.e., assignment of participants
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to one of three self-concept threat conditions, one of two explicit-implicit measure
orders, and one of four cartoon caption orders.
Captions were displayed in one of two random orders for each cartoon—forward
or backward—with the forward order displaying a random arrangement of captions and
the backward order displaying these same captions, but in reverse order. Thus,
participants were randomly assigned to surveys that featured one of four caption orders
for Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2, i.e., forward-forward, forward-backward, backwardbackward, and backward-forward. Statistically, a one-way ANOVA revealed no
significant differences among average Cartoon 1 and Cartoon 2 initial-letter biases
between the four different caption orders, F(3, 390) = 1.76, p = .16. Methodologically,
this caption arrangement marks an improvement over previous researchers’ methods
which utilized a single fixed random order of name-letter candybars for all participants
(Brendl et al., 2005).
Is the I-Algorithm Too Conservative?
When scoring the NLT, most researchers use the baseline-corrected algorithm
(“B-algorithm”) to compute name-letter preferences (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009). This
method involves simply subtracting normative baseline letter ratings from participants’
initial-letter ratings. While widely used, the B-algorithm has several issues including the
production of skewed distributions and large standard deviations, while failing to control
for participants’ individual response tendencies such as those due to differences in mood
or affect (LeBel & Gawronski, 2009).
LeBel and Gawronski (2009) recommend the use of the ipsatized doublecorrection algorithm (“I-algorithm”) when computing name-letter preference scores,
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based on results obtained after re-analyzing 18 different sets of studies that used the
NLT. To compute scores, letter ratings are first ipsatized by subtracting the mean rating
assigned to non-initial letters from all letter ratings—including both non-initials and
initials. Next, normative ipsatized baseline letter ratings (assigned by participants who
did not have that initial) are subtracted from respondents’ ipsatized initial-letter rating.
This algorithm offers both methodological advantages as well as statistical
benefits. Methodologically, the I-algorithm double-corrects at the individual and group
level. First, it controls for participants’ individual response tendencies—such as those due
to mood, affect, or acquiescence—by ipsatizing letter ratings as described above. Second,
it controls for aesthetic variability in name-letter stimuli by subtracting normative
ipsatized baseline ratings from respondents’ ipsatized initial-letter rating. In the current
study, the I-algorithm’s methodological superiority was especially desirable when it came
to computing initial-letter biases in the cartoon caption tasks because it a) controlled for
individual response tendencies due to mood, affect, and acquiescence in the first step of
the calculation, and b) controlled for baseline differences in captions’ humor in the
second step. And in LeBel & Gawronski’s (2009) meta-analysis, the I-algorithm boasted
the following statistical advantages: high reliability estimates, the lowest levels of
skewness/kurtosis, zero outliers, while introducing very little error due to the algorithm’s
control over participants’ individual response tendencies and baseline letter
attractiveness.
Despite these benefits and its well-documented optimality, some might argue that
the I-algorithm is an overly conservative method for computing initial-letter biases
because it doubly corrects initial-letter ratings. Doing so might serve to attenuate a name
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letter effect that might have been otherwise observed if a less conservative algorithm
had been used, such as the B-algorithm or S-algorithm. To examine this possibility,
overall initial-letter biases were re-analyzed using each of the four other scoring
algorithms (the B-algorithm, S-algorithm, D-algorithm, and Z-algorithm).
Initial-letter biases on the NLT were highly significant using all five algorithms
(all ps < .001), with effect sizes ranging from d = .68–1.01. Biases on Cartoon 1 were
significant on all algorithms (all ps < .05; all ds = .10–.19), except for the D-algorithm,
which produced a negative but nonsignificant name letter effect. Interestingly, the Dalgorithm was the only algorithm that found significant initial-letter biases on Cartoon 2,
but these biases were also negative in valence. When biases on both Cartoon 1 and
Cartoon 2 captions were averaged together, all algorithms except for the B-algorithm
found significant name letter effects (all ps < .01), with effect sizes ranging from d = –.16
(again, the D-algorithm) to d = .17 (S-algorithm).
The S-algorithm was the only algorithm to find a significant and positive name
letter effect for nickname initials on the NLT (p < .001, d = .37), while only the Dalgorithm’s computation of negative initial-letter biases observed for the cartoon caption
tasks consistently reached significance across all analyses (all ps < .05, all ds = –.32 to
–.43). Negative nickname-initial biases computed with the I-algorithm were significant
(p = .05, d = –.29) only when scores were averaged across both sets of captions. Please
refer to Table 16 for average initial-letter biases as computed by each of the five scoring
algorithms.
Based on these supplementary analyses, the I-algorithm does not appear to have
been too conservative. Results using the I-algorithm were similar to those achieved with

122

123
two of the less conservative scoring algorithms (the B-algorithm and S-algorithm). In
fact, initial-letter biases computed using the I-algorithm were very highly correlated with
both of these algorithms, as well as the two other algorithms (all rs > .87, all ps < .001).
Of the five algorithms, the D-algorithm produced the weakest initial-letter biases,
however this may be because it produced the largest number of extreme values on the
low end of the distribution—as many as 12 potential NLT outliers and 7 outliers in the
analysis of average initial-letter biases on both cartoons’ captions. LeBel and Gawronski
(2009) also found the D-algorithm fared the worst out of the five algorithms with respect
to the production of outliers. In the current study, the I-algorithm produced one of the
lowest numbers of potential outliers, second only to the B-algorithm—which does not
correct for individual response tendencies. Based on past and current research, the Ialgorithm seems to indeed be the optimal scoring method for computing name-letter
biases in this and future studies on the name letter effect.
Future Research on Name-Letter Biases
One of the most surprising and interesting findings of the present study was that
significant name letter effects were not found for nickname initials on the NLT or on the
humor judgments task and only a small, marginally significant nickname letter bias was
found for men on the NLT. Based on the difference observed between men’s and
women’s affinity for nickname initials, are nicknames more self-defining for men than
they are for women? Or, are nicknames equally self-defining for men and women, but
women possess negative affect toward their nicknames and nickname initials? The latter
explanation seems tenable—at least when it came to assigning humor ratings to captions
submitted by same-nickname initial writers. Women demonstrated a consistent trend of
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negative biases toward same-nickname initial writers’ captions, which reached
significance for Cartoon 1. While only the Cartoon 1 nickname-initial biases exhibited by
women reached significance, this otherwise consistent trend is difficult to ignore.
Based on the present study’s unexpected, yet consistent findings for either
negative or zero-biases demonstrated toward nickname letters, it behooves future
researchers examining name-letter biases to make the distinction between first given
names and nicknames as participants’ target of bias. Subsuming both types of names
under a single category is cautioned because it is unclear to what degree observed nameletter preferences thus far may have been attenuated by nicknames which might not be
imbued with the same self-defining properties as one’s first given name—even for people
who “go by” a nickname. Researchers would be wise to query participants directly for
their first given name—if different from the name they go by—to avoid making a Type II
error. Moreover, doing so will provide additional opportunities to examine nickname
letters as self-referential stimuli or whether confrontation with nickname letters triggers
intervening cognitive processes that may serve to mitigate or even reverse the name letter
effect, as was the case with the current study.
Likewise, and based on the present investigation’s results, single-item measures
of implicit self-esteem might be adapted to assess participants’ nickname-liking
specifically, if they go by such a name. It is unclear which name respondents used to
make their name-liking ratings on this measure and, consequently, whether this measure
accurately examined nicknamed participants’ implicit self-esteem. If nicknames are not
as self-referential as are first given names like the findings of this study suggest—or
alternatively, if they are self-defining, but carry negative affect for some women—then
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we might not have an accurate picture of participants’ implicit self-esteem if they
relied on liking of their nicknames while completing this measure.
More research is needed to differentiate the NLT as an implicit self-esteem
instrument versus a measure of implicit egotism. Does it measure one’s unconscious
global self-worth, or is it best understood merely as an index of one’s predisposition to
rely on universal automatic self-positivity biases? While the tendency to rely on
automatic positivity biases might be universal, implicit self-esteem cannot. Initial-letter
biases were smaller—and in some instances even reversed—among those with low
implicit self-esteem, however, this effect did not reach statistical significance. Level of
implicit self-esteem as a whole only predicted a very small proportion (1–2%) of first
given name initial-letter biases on both of the name-letter preference tasks, and NLT
biases were uncorrelated with explicit self-esteem. Results of the current study suggest
that name-letter preferences are not synonymous with implicit self-esteem and that
favorable self-attitudes—whether implicit or explicit—are not a necessary condition of
initial-letter biases. Just because people possess a universal dominant response tendency
to prefer their name letters does not mean this preference is diagnostic of high implicit
self-esteem. In the present study, less than one-third of participants possessed the
favorable self-attitudes thought to drive name-letter preferences.
Jones et al. (2004) have suggested that important decisions—such as choices in
mates, careers, and places of residence—are inherently threatening to the self-concept
because these decisions carry costly consequences. As such, implicit egotism—as defined
by the tendency to gravitate toward people, jobs, and cities/states that share our selfattributes—might serve the purpose of an unconscious “safety signal,’’ with presumably
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the least threatening person an individual knows being him or herself. Thus, by
association, self-related targets are deemed the “safe” and least-threatening choice among
the larger array. Such a “threat-buffering function” view of implicit egotism says nothing
about people’s favorable self-attitudes spilling over into evaluations of self-related
objects. In fact, people who feel good about themselves should not be as threatened by
important life decisions and should therefore not be as apt to rely on the unconscious
“safety signal” broadcast by name letters, as compared to those who do not possess such
favorable self-attitudes and self-confidence.
On the contrary, previous researchers have found temporary threats to the selfconcept can serve as a motive for participants to self-enhance when confronted with
name-letter stimuli, particularly among those with high explicit self-esteem. In the
current study, however, evidence of implicit egotism’s function as a safety signal or
similar self-regulating purpose following a threat to the self-concept was not found (even
on the NLT which demonstrated a very strong name letter effect). This is unexpected and
difficult to explain because measures of explicit self-esteem and the threat manipulation
were identical to the ones used by previous researchers who observed such an interaction
(Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, & Hetts, 2002). Additional research is needed in order to
further investigate whether preferring our name letters serves a self-regulating (or other)
function and whether there are unconscious self-serving benefits to be had for exhibiting
biases toward these self-related stimuli.
A trend for the additive effects of shared gender on initial-letter biases was found.
Extensions and replications of these effects are needed to firmly establish this dual source
of bias toward self-related attributes. Recently, the 281st real-life New Yorker cartoon
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caption contest was won by film critic Roger Ebert, which might be less than
surprising to those who allege Mr. Ebert had “a leg up” in the competition due to his
celebrity. However, social psychologists—and implicit egotism researchers in
particular—might argue he had two: his gender and his name letters he shared with New
Yorker cartoon caption contest editor Robert Mankoff. Whether Robert’s self-relevant
trait of gender and the name letters he shared with Roger—four letters in total—worked
in tandem to land the famous film critic among the weekly contest’s finalists is unknown,
but to scientific minds fascinated with dissecting humor, it’s great fun to speculate. After
all, for participant judges in the current cartoon caption contest study, shared name letters
with caption writers—and to some extent, shared gender—were indeed a laughing matter.

APPENDIX A
ROSENBERG SELF-ESTEEM SCALE (RSES)
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Instructions: Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about
yourself. If you strongly agree, choose SA. If you agree with the statement, choose A.
If you disagree, choose D. If you strongly disagree, choose SD.

1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.

SA A D SD

2. At times, I think I am no good at all.

SA A D SD

3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

SA A D SD

4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.

SA A D SD

5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.

SA A D SD

6. I certainly feel useless at times.

SA A D SD

7. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. SA A D SD
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.

SA A D SD

9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.

SA A D SD

10. I take a positive attitude toward myself.

SA A D SD

!
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Cartoon 1
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Cartoon 2

APPENDIX C
THE NAME LETTER TEST (NLT)
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Instructions: This portion of the study is concerned with aesthetic judgments of lexical stimuli. While it
might seem unusual to evaluate the letters of the alphabet in terms of their beauty, previous research has
found such judgments to foster a better understanding of language and human emotions. Please estimate
how beautiful you find each of the following letters using your “gut feelings.”

Q

D

U

Y

I

G

R

T

P

M
A

B

H

X

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

K

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

E

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

S

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

N

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

W

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

C

J

L

F

O

Z

V
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(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(1)
not at all
beautiful

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)
extremely
beautiful

(7)
extremely
beautiful
(7)
extremely
beautiful
(7)
extremely
beautiful
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